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WILL IT TAKE A MOVE BY THE NEW YORK
YANKEES FOR THE SENECA NATION
TO OBTAIN A CLASS III
GAMING LICENSE?
The recent surge in tribal reservation gaming has escalated the rivalry
between New York and New Jersey over legalized gambling.' An unin-
tended consequence of this rivalry was New York's threat to legalize
high-stakes gambling2 state-wide should New Jersey successfully lure
New York's professional baseball team across the river.3 This threat is
1. See Jerry Zremski, Trump Says Mob Targets Indian Gambling, BUFFALO NEWS,
Oct. 6, 1993, at A10 (describing Donald Trump's testimony to Congress protesting the
growth of Indian gaming). Trump, owner of three casinos in Atlantic City, New Jersey,
appeared before Congress on October 5, 1993, as part of the debate on controlling Indian
gambling. Id. Just prior to the congressional hearings, New York approved its first Indian
casino-Tirning Stone Casino on Oneida Indian land in Verona, near Syracuse. Id. At
the time, other tribes, including the Seneca Nation, had discussed opening additional casi-
nos on their reservations. Id.; see also Mitchell Zuckoff & Doug Bailey, Indians Pursue a
Golden Chance, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 29, 1993, at Al (discussing the unfair match be-
tween Atlantic City's millionaire developer Donald Trump who opposes Indian gambling
and Mystic Lake, Minnesota's Tracy Stade, a Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux with a high
school diploma). Trump filed a federal lawsuit in 1993 alleging that he was disadvantaged
by Stade and other Indians in his casino gambling activities. Id. Trump, using his influence
to contain Indian gambling, argued that Indian gaming is infiltrated by organized crime.
What Trump Said on Indian Gaming, USA TODAY, Dec. 6, 1993, at 11A (printing excerpts
of Trump's testimony before a House panel on Indian gambling). It is more likely, how-
ever, that he is concerned over the effect of this new source of competition on his gambling
empire in Atlantic City, New Jersey. See Leonard Prescott, Stop Picking on Indian Gam-
bling, USA TODAY, Dec. 6, 1993, at 11A (explaining that Indian gaming benefits both
tribes and states and emphasizing the Indian commitment to prevent the loss of this valua-
ble resource from both criminal and governmental involvement).
2. See Robert Fachet, Baseball, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1993, at C2. Governor Cuomo's
intention reflected the political controversy resulting from the meteoric rise of Indian gam-
bling in the New York area, including the opening of the Foxwoods Casino in Ledyard,
Connecticut, the Turning Stone Casino in Verona, New York, and current discussions re-
garding the Seneca Nation's plans to open a casino on their lands in western New York.
See Zremski, supra note 1, at A10 (reporting on Donald Trump's testimony before Con-
gress protesting the controversial growth of Indian gambling, the opening of the Oneida
Tribe's Turning Stone Casino, and the Seneca Nation's discussion on opening a casino of
their own).
3. Fachet, supra note 2, at C2 (recounting Governor Cuomo's intent to make clear to
New Jersey, Donald Trump, and George Steinbrenner all possible ramifications of a move
by the Yankees out of New York); see also Carolyn White, Elsewhere, USA TODAY, Oct. 8,
1993, at 13C.
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but one example of the problems resulting from state jealousy4 over non-
taxable revenues generated by tribes from high-stakes, casino-style gam-
bling5 permitted under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988
(IGRA).6 Consequently, states are reluctant to facilitate Indian casino
operations and continue to lobby heavily for their own state legislatures
to pass laws permitting casino-style gambling.7
Under IGRA, an Indian tribe must obtain the state's cooperation to
operate Class III, or casino-style, gaming on reservations within state bor-
ders.8 The tribe and the state in which their reservation is located must
negotiate an agreement, or compact (Tribal-State compact),9 to regulate
the gambling." The compact is then approved by the United States Sec-
4. See Victor Dricks, Pressure on to Ban Tribal Gaming Halls, PHOENIX GAZETTE,
Feb. 17, 1993, at Al (identifying the opposition to Indian gambling in the States of Califor-
nia, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Wisconsin).
5. See 25 C.F.R. § 502.4 (1993) (listing the types of gaming considered as high-stakes,
Las Vegas-style gaming). High-stakes, casino-type gambling is termed Class III gambling.
Id. It includes all forms of gambling not included in Class I or Class II gaming and may
include: (1) card games where one bets against the house such as blackjack, baccarat,
chemin de fer, and pai gow; (2) casino games such as roulette, craps, and keno; (3) slot
machine games and electronic facsimiles of any game of chance; (4) sports betting and
parimutuel wagering; and (5) lotteries. Id.
6. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 88 2701-
2721 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
7. See Peter Hellman, Casino Craze, TRAVEL-HOLIDAY, Mar. 1994, at 80, 82-83, 132
(discussing the proliferation of gambling throughout the United States and noting Louisi-
ana's governor's prediction that United States cities with populations of at least one mil-
lion will soon have casinos of their own); see also Ellen Hale, Other Cities Hope Gaming
Will Help Put Them on a Roll, USA TODAY, Oct. 25, 1993, at 9A (describing current
activities in state legislatures to pass riverboat gambling operations).
8. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
9. Id. § 2710(d)(3) (requiring tribes to enter into agreements with states, called Tri-
bal-State compacts, governing any Class III gaming a tribe conducts on its land).
10. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C) (identifying permissive provisions included in Tribal-State
compacts); see Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 276-77 (8th Cir.
1993) (summarizing the ultimately successful conclusion of a Tribal-State compact between
the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe and South Dakota in 1990); see also Harold A. Monteau,
Tribal-State Gambling Compacts Under the Provisions of Class III Gaming in the Federal
Indian Gaming Act, in SPEAKING THE TRUTH ABOUT INDIAN GAMING doc. 3, at 2-3 (Na-
tional Indian Gaming Ass'n ed., 1993) (on file with the Catholic University Law Review)
[hereinafter SPEAKING THE TRUTH] (explaining the statutory negotiation process for con-
cluding Tribal-State compacts). Tribal-State compacts may include provisions that identify:
(1) which government's law and regulations apply; (2) who issues the license; (3) which
government has criminal and civil enforcement jurisdiction; (4) any amounts paid to the
state for enforcement or regulatory activities'; and (5) remedies for the breach of a compact
or violation of other Class III gaming activity. Id. Other provisions may include specifica-
tions regarding tribal taxation of Indian gaming activities at comparable state rates, specifi-
cations for licensing and operations, agreements allowing concurrent state jurisdiction, and
types of gaming operations, including mechanical gaming devices. Id.
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retary of the Interior." Understanding that states enjoy a pronounced
bargaining advantage over tribes, 2 Congress provided tribes with access
to federal district courts to compel states to negotiate. 13 Until recently,
states argued successfully that the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition of
suits against a state 14 effectively shielded them from federal jurisdiction 5
in suits initiated by tribes.' 6 It is questionable, however, whether the
Eleventh Amendment will be removed from the states' arsenal of ob-
structive tactics used to combat Indian gaming. Nevertheless, recent deci-
sions from the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits hopefully will encourage tribal-state negotiations and forestall
protracted litigation, a process which places undue burdens upon tribes as
they contend with the interminable delay associated with the appeals pro-
cess, 7 the possible loss of an impartial judicial forum to hear the dis-
11. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B), (d)(8).
12. See Eric D. Jones, Note, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: A Forum for Conflict
Among the Plenary Power of Congress, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Eleventh Amendment,
18 VT. L. REV. 127, 146 (1993) (explaining that states enjoy a pronounced bargaining ad-
vantage over tribes because a tribe typically must consent to state jurisdiction over gaming
activities to conclude a Tribal-State compact).
13. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A); see also Scott Crowell & Jerry Straus, States Wrongly
Assert that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Violates the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments
to Avoid Fair Dealing With Tribes, in SPEAKING THE TRUTH, supra note 10, at doc. 5, at I
(noting that federal court litigation, brought by tribes against states directly contributed to
tribal successes in Connecticut, Minnesota, and Wisconsin).
14. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: "The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. Xl. Some
states also have argued that the Tenth Amendment effectively bars federal jurisdiction
under IGRA. This argument, however, has met with little success. See Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe, 3 F.3d at 281; see also William T. Bisset, Tribal-State Gaming Compacts: The
Constitutionality of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 92
(1993) (analyzing the Tenth Amendment's application to IGRA).
15. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 45 (4th ed.
1991). While the Eleventh Amendment generally acts as a jurisdictional bar to lawsuits
against state governments in federal court, it does not bar a plaintiff from bringing suit
against the state in state court in certain circumstances. Id.
16. See Crowell & Straus, supra note 13, at 2 n.1 (listing six pending United States
Court of Appeals cases in which the district courts agreed with state arguments that Con-
gress lacked constitutional authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity); Amber
J. Ahola, Comment, "Call It the Revenge of the Pequots," or How American Indian Tribes
Can Sue States Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Without Violating the Eleventh
Amendment, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 907, 916-27 (1993) (discussing exceptions to the states'
Eleventh Amendment argument to prevent tribes from suing in federal district court pur-
suant to IGRA).
17. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1020 (11th Cir.) (providing an exam-
ple of the type of protracted litigation surrounding Class III gaming), petition for cert. filed,
63 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. July 1, 1994) (No. 94-12). The Seminole Tribe initiated suit in
federal district court on September 19, 1991, and obtained a favorable ruling. Id. The
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pute, 8 and the loss of potential gaming revenue necessary for their
economic survival.' 9
This Comment deplores the lack of options available to tribes when
states refuse to negotiate in good faith to conclude a Tribal-State compact
for Class III gaming. This Comment begins by examining the economic
situation of tribes before and after passage of IGRA. Next, this Com-
ment focuses on judicial interpretation of the federal jurisdiction afforded
tribes by IGRA when states refuse to negotiate. This Comment asserts
that, based on statutory language, legislative history, and the public policy
goals of IGRA, Congress had the intent and the power to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to encourage state participation
in regulating gaming activity. This Comment further argues that the
Supreme Court must resolve the differences in the judicial approaches to
state sovereign immunity from suit and must expressly acknowledge Con-
gress' power to abrogate this immunity pursuant to the Indian Commerce
Clause. This Comment concludes that Congress must amend IGRA to
clarify its intent to subject states to federal jurisdiction, to make Tribal-
State compact negotiations voluntary, and to provide immediate federal-
tribal regulation of Class III gaming upon failure of the compact negotia-
tion process.
State appealed and the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court decision on January 18,
1994. Id.
18. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 15, at 46. When states invoke Eleventh Amend-
ment sovereign immunity from federal jurisdiction, this does not bar suit in state court in
certain circumstances. Id.; see also Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 425-26 (1979) (holding
that California residents injured in an auto accident in California by a Nevada state em-
ployee could bring suit in California state court against the State of Nevada because princi-
ples of federalism or state comity were not violated). Even though a suit is not barred, the
tribe may face anti-Indian prejudice because Indian gaming disputes involve states and
state judiciaries may be influenced by state political sentiments. Ahola, supra note 16, at
912 n.33.
19. Paul Lieberman, Indians See Battle Ahead Over Future of Gambling, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 1991, at Al, A22 (explaining that according to the Chairman of the National In-
dian Gaming Commission (NIGC), gambling is currently the only way for Indians to de-
velop economically on the reservation); see also Patricia A. Marks, Three Studies of the
Positive Economic Impact of Indian Tribal Gaming Industries in, SPEAKING THE TRUTH,
supra note 10, at doc. 9 (reviewing the results of studies conducted in Minnesota, Wiscon-
sin, and Michigan on the significant beneficial economic impact Indian gaming confers on
the Indian and local non-Indian communities); infra part I.B (discussing the beneficial im-
pact of Indian gaming).
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I. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INDIAN GAMING
A. Tribal Economic Conditions Before IGRA
Most Indians living on the United States' 350 tribal reservations are
impoverished, suffering from an alcoholism rate 663% higher than the
general population, a suicide rate 95% higher, and an unemployment rate
200% higher than the national average.20 These deplorable conditions
exist despite the limited federal and state economic assistance provided
to Indians. 21 In states with Indian populations, Indians represent a dis-
proportionate amount of individuals receiving public assistance.22
Although some reservations have timber industries, electronics plants,
or telephone stations,23 Indian reservations more frequently are located
in remote rural areas unattractive to industry.24 Manufacturing thrives
on only a few reservations.25 To generate economic revenue, one state
government encourages tribes to undertake projects such as goat farm-
ing.26 Consequently, tribes naturally seek other, more lucrative means to
generate the revenue necessary for providing vital social services. One
California tribe resorted to permitting a 600-acre landfill on its land;27
another in Arizona agreed to accept a hazardous waste incinerator;28 still
another in New Mexico permitted the United States Department of En-
ergy to study the feasibility of creating a site to store radioactive fuel.
29
Not all tribes are in a position to seek alternatives. Thus, out of necessity,
many tribes seek to capitalize on the popular pastime of gambling in
bingo halls and casinos.30
20. Joan Oleck, Tribal Warfare: Indians Want to Clear the Way for More Casinos, But
the States are Fighting Them Hard, RESTAURANT Bus., June 10, 1993, at 56, 58; California
Indians; Buffalo Stakes, THE ECONOMIST, July 24, 1993, at 25, 25 (reporting statistics from
1988, the year IGRA was passed).
21. See W. John Moore, A Winning Hand?, 25 NAT'L J. 1796, 1799 (July 17, 1993)
(commenting that the amount of federal funds provided to tribes by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) for economic assistance dropped by two-thirds between 1977 and 1992).
22. See id. at 1799. Although Indians comprise 7.3% of Montana's population, they
represent 54.2% of the population receiving federal welfare. Id. Unfortunately, reserva-
tion economies generally rely more on welfare than employment for their income. Id.
23. Lieberman, supra note 19, at A22.
24. Id.
25. Moore, supra note 21, at 1799.
26. Lieberman, supra note 19, at A22.
27. Moore, supra note 21, at 1799.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Bill Duryea, Indians Want a Hand in High Stakes Poker, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Aug. 22, 1993, at lB (contrasting the full parking lot of the Seminole Bingo Hall in
Tampa with the empty parking lots.of the other Tampa Seminole Indian tourist attractions
and gift shop).
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During the Reagan administration, tribes started to expand their small
gambling operations in an effort to generate revenue 3' to compensate for
shortfalls caused by declining federal assistance from the United States
Department of the Interior.32 Several court cases reaffirmed the fact that
states were unable to employ Public Law 83-280 (Public Law 280) to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over tribal gaming activities conducted on reserva-
tions.33 Consequently, by July 1993, Indian tribes operated 152 bingo
halls and 23 casinos in the United States and generated tax-free revenues
of approximately $6 billion.34
31. See Moore, supra note 21, at 1796.
32. Oleck, supra note 20, at 58. During the Reagan administration, Interior Secretary
James Watt reportedly told one Indian group to start their own " 'damn business' " and to
stop "depending on the Great White Father." Id.
33. E.g., Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Duffy, 694 F.2d
1185, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1982) (precluding enforcement of state and county laws pertaining
to the operation of bingo games against the tribe), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983); Semi-
nole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 312 (5th Cir. 1981) (precluding enforcement of a
state statute against a tribe that restricts bingo gaming to specified organizations), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982). The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits also based their decisions on the civil/regulatory criminal/prohibitory dichotomy
established in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 378-81 (1976). This analysis developed
from judicial application of sections 2 and 4 of Public Law 280, Act of August 15, 1953, ch.
505, §§ 2, 4,67 Stat. 588, 588-89 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360, respec-
tively). Bryan, 426 U.S. at 378-81. As Public Law 280 states, California has criminal juris-
diction and limited civil jurisdiction over Indian tribes. Id. Florida later opted to be
subject to Public Law 280. 25 U.S.C. § 1747(b) (1988); see infra notes 91, 92. Courts,
however, include in this jurisdiction criminal activities that are prohibited by the state and
exclude from jurisdiction civil activities that merely are regulated by the state and are not
contrary to public policy. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 378-81. Because states permitted and regu-
lated bingo games, the Fifth and Ninth Circuit courts held that Indian operation of bingo
games on tribal lands in violation of state statutes was a civil/regulatory activity not con-
trary to states' public policy and, therefore, not subject to state jurisdiction. Cabazon Band
of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 783 F.2d 900, 903 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 480 U.S.
202 (1987); Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court, in California v. Cabazon Band of Mis-
sion Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), held that the State and county could not enforce gam-
bling regulations on reservations because Indian gambling was not contrary to public
policy, was civil and regulatory in nature, and thus, state regulations were unenforceable
under Public Law 280. Id. at 209-12; see Connie K. Haslam, Note, Indian Sovereignty:
Confusion Prevails- California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 107 S. Ct. 1083
(1987), 63 WASH. L. REV. 169, 181 (1988).
34. Moore, supra note 21, at 1798.
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B. Economic Impact of IGRA on Tribes and States
1. IGRA's Impact on Indian Tribes
Tribal gaming revenue, although minuscule in comparison to total
United States gambling revenues,3" is the lifeblood of many tribes. For
example, the Wisconsin. Winnebago Tribe uses eighty-five percent of its
gaming revenue to fund schools, a government complex, middle-income
housing, and non-gaming ventures. 36 With these monies, the Winnebagos
built three smoke shops, a meat-processing plant, and an interstate travel
plaza that houses five Winnebago-owned businesses.3 7
In Connecticut, despite strong state opposition, the Mashantucket Pe-
quot Tribe opened Foxwoods Casino in February 1992.38 As a result, the
Pequots enjoy an unprecedented economic boon and are purchasing
much of the original 2000 acres of their tribal lands. 39 All 250 members
of the tribe share in the revenues netted by Foxwoods4 ° and, as a result of
the casino's success, cradle-to-grave social services 41 now exist.42 Apart-
ments, houses, and health clinics are under construction, and, in its first
year of operation, the casino gave each tribal member a profit participa-
tion check in an amount between $5,000 and $50,000.1
3
35. Gary Enos, Tribes Hit on Gaming; Congress' Help Sought to Curb Proliferation of
Indian Casinos, CRAIN'S CITY & STATE, Apr. 12-25, 1993, at 1, 22. In 1991, with $720
million in national gross gambling revenues, revenues from Indian gaming comprised a
mere two percent of the gaming industry. Id.; see also Hellman, supra note 7, at 80 (dis-
cussing recent developments in Indian gaming and noting that Indian gaming revenues
grew to $1.5 billion in 1992).
36. Daniel Roth, Winnebago Indian Tribe Bringing Legal Work Inside Casino Gam-
bling is a Growth Industry, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1993, at 1.
37. Id.
38. Kim I. Eisler, Revenge of the Indians, WASHINGTONIAN, Aug. 1993, at 65, 141. In
1667, those Pequots who survived massacres, avoided assimilation into the Narragansett
and Mohican tribes, and were not sold into slavery by the British, were given 2000 acres of
Connecticut land. Id. at 67. By the 1970s, however, only 178 acres and one resident eld-
erly Pequot woman remained. Id. Connecticut planned to repossess the land upon her
death and to create a state park. Id. Fortunately for the Pequots, the woman persuaded
her grandson to return to the reservation. Id. He investigated economic opportunities,
saw the bingo hall operations run by the Seminoles in Florida, and under the aegis of
IGRA, created Foxwoods. Id.
39. Id. at 67, 141.
40. Id. at 141. In its first year of operation, Foxwoods netted $100 million on $1 billion
of revenue. Id. at 141.
41. Id. at 66. Cradle-to-grave social services typically include medical, housing, educa-
tion, and recreational services for tribal members beginning at birth and continuing until
death. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. IGRA permits per capita payments to tribe members pursuant to a plan, ap-
proved by the Secretary "to allocate revenues to uses authorized by paragraph (2)(B)." 25
U.S.C. § 2710(b)(3)(A); see 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(2)(A). Paragraph (2)(B) restricts the use
of gaming revenues "(i) to fund tribal government operations or programs; (ii) to provide
1994]
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2. IGRA's Impact on States
a. Wisconsin
In Wisconsin, Class III gaming revenues created 11,483 jobs primarily
as a consequence of casino employment and secondarily as a result of
retail and construction spending." Consequently, 1400 people were
taken off unemployment and 820 off welfare; the Indian casino put them
on payroll a.4  Other benefits accrue to the State because many of Wiscon-
sin's tribal reservations do not contain large grocery or clothing stores,
gas stations, auto dealerships, or insurance companies.46 Thus, the $68
million Indian gaming payroll is spent outside the reservation, but within
Wisconsin 7.4  Tourists who patronize casinos and purchase goods and
services from Wisconsin merchants create an additional 5603 jobs. 8
The local economy is not the only beneficiary of tribal gaming reve-
nues. The State of Wisconsin received nearly $385,000 in tax revenues
from tribal casino employees and the federal government received $2.1
million.49 The State also derives additional savings because casino em-
ployees no longer are dependent on state welfare, unemployment com-
pensation, or other state-funded services.5 ° Wisconsin alone realized a
$27.5 million annual savings in its public assistance programs.
5 1
for the general welfare of the Indian tribe and its members; (iii) to promote tribal eco-
nomic development; (iv) to donate to charitable organizations; or (v) to help fund opera-
tions of local government agencies." 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B). These per capita
payments are subject to federal income taxation. Id. § 2710(b)(3)(D).
44. See Marks, supra note 19, at 2-4.
45. Id. at 2. A 1992 study performed by Dr. James Murray of the University of Wis-
consin confirms these figures. Id. His report identified other benefits conferred on Wis-
consin resulting from tribal casino expenditures of $62 million per year for purchases and
$30 million for gaming-related construction. Id. at 2-3.
46. Id. at 3.
47. Id.
48. Id. Day visitors to Wisconsin's 15 tribal casinos spend, on average, $35 per day on
food and drink. Id. Overnight visitors spend, on average, $125 per person for the same
items plus lodging. Id. In addition, 17% of these visitors originate from outside Wisconsin
and 53% from outside the local area. Id.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2. Of the total 4500 employees of tribal casinos, 2000 of whom are not
Indian, 3000 rely 100% on the income derived from gaming employment. Id. In the event
that Class III gaming is outlawed, these 3000 people would lose their jobs and be forced to
rely on state economic assistance in the amount of $27,465,000 per year (average unem-
ployment compensation in Wisconsin is $176 per week, $9,152 per year). Id.
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1994] IGRA'S Class III Gaming
b. Minnesota
Similarly, Minnesota experienced a dramatic drop in the number of
welfare recipients as a result of permitting Indian Class III gaming.5" The
State's thirteen tribal casinos employ nearly 10,000 individuals, twenty-
five percent of whom are Indians,53 making Indian gaming Minnesota's
seventh largest employer. 54 The $116 million payroll for these employees
is dispensed outside the reservation in local clothing and grocery stores,
auto dealerships, insurance companies, and utility companies.55 Further-
more, Minnesota's casino-related construction expenditures are esti-
mated at $95.9 million.56 Minnesota also benefits from the $3 million
annually spent by tribes in their efforts to attract tourists57 who, in turn,
boost the local economy by spending money on lodging, food, entertain-
ment, and shopping. By law, tribal gaming revenues must be used to pro-
vide for economic development, social services, welfare, and government
purposes.58 Thus, Minnesota also gains because the tribes' members are
less dependent on state social welfare programs.59
c. Michigan
Eight tribal gaming operations in Michigan employ approximately 2000
people6 ° with a total payroll of $13.5 million per year.6 ' Just over sixty
percent of those employed are Indians.6' These Indian employees pro-
vide financial support for an additional 3,100 tribal members.63 Prior to
52. See Moore, supra note 21 (explaining that the unemployment rate among the
Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe in Minnesota declined from 60% to almost 0%).
53. See Marks, supra note 19, at 4.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The tribes already spent $68.8 million on casino construction with plans to
spend an additional $27.1 million within the next few years. Id.
57. Id. at 5. This $3 million tourist attraction expenditure figure is more than twice the
amount spent by the Minnesota Office of Tourism during fiscal year 1992. Id.
58. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B), (b)(3) (1988); see also Marks, supra note 19, at 5 (dis-
cussing these revenue-related provisions).
59. See Moore, supra note 21, at 1796-97 (explaining that the tribal government is
constructing homes, roads, schools, and a health clinic with the Mille Lacs' gaming reve-
nues). Furthermore, the tribe views the pecuniary benefit of reservation gambling as a way
to increase tribal self-development and tribal self-sufficiency. Id. at 1797. Moore states
that "gambling represents more than a measure of financial freedom. In the eyes of tribal
leaders, it could be the key to giving Indians control over their own destiny." Id.
60. Marks, supra note 19, at 5.
61. Id.; see also Thomas L. Wilson, Indian Gaming and Economic Development on the
Reservation, 68 MICH. B.J. 380, 383 (1989) (observing that since the Saginaw Chippewa
Tribe of Michigan began conducting gaming in 1980, unemployment levels have signifi-
cantly dropped from their 1980 high of 50%).
62. Marks, supra note 19, at 5.
63. Id.
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the establishment of tribal casinos, nearly forty percent of these casino
employees received some form of state or federal welfare assistance,
while an additional thirty percent received unemployment compensa-
tion. ' As a direct result of gaming operations, Michigan casinos contrib-
uted nearly $654,000 to federal and state unemployment tax revenue.65
Expenditures by Michigan tribal gaming operations on food, supplies,
utilities, insurance, and other necessities total $41 million.66 Nearly all of
these dollars are spent within Michigan's borders.67 Gaming operations
also attract foreign dollars from Canada and other countries.68 Currently,
thirty-six percent of Michigan tribal casinos' patrons reside outside the
United States.69 Furthermore, these visitors spend money at local Michi-
gan businesses as well as at the casinos.7" Thus, local areas also enjoy the
benefits of tribal gaming revenues.7'
d. Connecticut
Since the opening of the Foxwoods casino on the Mashantucket Pequot
reservation near Mystic, Connecticut, residents in the surrounding region
have benefitted from the spillover effect of tribal gaming revenue.72 Con-
necticut residents have access to the reservation's free health clinic and
ambulance service, local banks have solicited a greater volume of depos-
its, and the tourist town of Mystic has recovered from its economic
slump.73 Furthermore, the Mashantucket Pequots are discussing plans




67. See Wilson, supra note 61, at 384 (commenting that local communities in Michigan
have profited from the gaming operations of the tribes because "dollars are often turned
over as many as 2 1/2 times").
68. Marks, supra note 19, at 6.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.; see also Wilson, supra note 61, at 381 (noting that Michigan tribal gaming
actually attracts tourist dollars, not funds otherwise spent on state-sanctioned lotteries).
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Despite Connecticut's resistance to permitting tribal gaming,7" the
State appears to enjoy its new source of revenue.76 With a 1992 payroll of
$86 million covering 4,370 staffers, the Mashantucket Pequot Indian Tribe
claims to be Connecticut's largest corporate taxpayer.7 Connecticut also
has negotiated an agreement with the Tribe to permit slot machines at the
casino in exchange for $100 million, or twenty-five percent of the antici-
pated slot machine revenue, whichever is greater.78
II. INDIAN GAMING REGULATORY Acr
IGRA is the result of several years of legislative efforts to create a
regulatory scheme for Indian gaming.79 Between 1983 and 1987, Con-
75. Id. at 141; see also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1032
(2d Cir. 1990) (requiring Connecticut to conclude a Tribal-State compact pursuant to
IGRA after determining that the State had acted in bad faith by refusing to negotiate with
the tribe), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 975 (1991). Ultimately, the State refused to agree to a
compact and the United States Secretary of the Interior eventually prescribed Class III
gaming procedures. See 56 Fed. Reg. 15,746 (1991); 56 Fed. Reg. 24,996 (1991); see also 25
U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) (1988 & Supp..V 1993).
76. See Moore, supra note 21, at 1797.
77. Id. at 1799.
78. See Hellman, supra note 7, at 80 (discussing the recent growth in United States
gambling activity). In 1993, Foxwoods boasted an attendance of 15,000-20,000 on week-
days and 20,000-30,000 on weekends. Id. Tribal gaming revenues, net of the state's share,
are expected to reach $113 million in fiscal 1994. Id.
79. Gary Sokolow, The Future of Gambling in Indian Country, 15 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
151, 182 (1990). Congressional interest in regulating Indian gaming began in the first ses-
sion of the Ninety-Eighth Congress via H.R. 4566. Id. at 155. This bill, introduced after
the decision in Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1020 (1982), was modeled after the Nevada Gaming Commission and provided for
a federal licensing scheme for Indian gaming supervised by a Department of the Interior
commission. Sokolow, supra, at 155. The bill was supported by one group of tribes on the
basis that it clarified existing law and was opposed by other groups because it impinged on
tribal sovereignty. Id. at 156. Ultimately it died in committee. Id.
The Ninety-Ninth Congress introduced three of the most important bills related to In-
dian gaming: S. 902, H.R. 1920, and S. 2557. Id. Of these, S. 902 was least comprehensive.
Id. This bill instituted specific federal standards for Indian gambling, required approval by
the Secretary of the Interior for tribal ordinances and management contracts, and estab-
lished a gaming commission without defining its power or organization. Id.
H.R. 1920 created a more comprehensive framework than that provided in S. 902. Id.
This bill established a National Gaming Commission that had the authority to approve
tribal ordinances and management contracts for the Secretary of the Interior. Id. The bill
also mandated that revenues be used to fund tribal functions. Id. The unusual feature of
the House bill was that it established three classes of gaming, Class I, II, and III, which
were jurisdictionally identical to those ultimately enacted in IGRA. Id. at 156, 159, 180.
H.R. 1920 also covered tribes that were not federally recognized. Id. at 157.
S. 2557 was the Reagan administration's response to H.R. 1920. Id. S. 2557 sought to
correct the perceived inadequacies of H.R. 1920 by providing for more rigorous regulation
of licensing, accounting, and auditing procedures. Id. at 158. S. 2557 focused, however,
almost exclusively on the regulation of bingo. Id. It also provided a gaming context for
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gress introduced numerous bills on the subject of Indian gaming.8 ° The
final bill, Senate Bill 55581 (S. 555), as enacted, was a compromise that
sought to balance the competing interests of tribes, states, and the gaming
industry.82
Concurrent with Congress' drafting of IGRA, the United States
Supreme Court decided California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.8 3
In Cabazon, the Court expressly approved the " 'civil/regulatory' "
" 'criminal/prohibitory'" dichotomy4 employed by the United States
Courts of Appeals85 in deciding whether the activity in question came
under the jurisdiction of Public Law 280, and thus subject to state regula-
application of Public Law 280 and provided for criminal sanctions under Title 18 of the
United States Code. Id. The bill also established a distinct category of crimes subject to
concurrent federal and state jurisdiction. Id. These three bills, however, died. Id.
The bill eventually enacted into law as IGRA, S. 555, sought to clarify the legal status of
Indian gambling and to protect tribes from coming under the influence of organized crime.
Id. at 159. Congress amended this bill and eventually President Ronald Reagan signed it
into law on October 17, 1988. Id. at 182; see also S. REP. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3071. Senators Daniel Inouye (D-Haw.), Chair-
man of the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Daniel Evans (R-Wash.), and
Thomas Daschle (D-S.D.) introduced the final gaming bill, S. 555, in the 100th Congress.
See Roland J. Santoni, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: How Did We Get Here? Where
Are We Going?, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 387, 401 (1993) (tracking the various pieces of
legislation leading to IGRA).
80. See supra note 79 (discussing legislative developments culminating in IGRA); see
also 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3092-3106 (outlining the views of Senators Inouye and Mc-
Cain in response to the various precursors to IGRA).
81. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 79, at 1, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3071. It
should be noted that the bill as reported to the Senate Indian Affairs Committee was
amended on the Senate floor. Id.
82. Id. The Senate Report explained that
S. 555 is the outgrowth of several years of discussions and negotiations between
gaming tribes, States, the gaming industry, the administration, and the Congress
... to formulate a system for regulating gaming on Indian lands... [while at the
same time preserving] the right of tribes to self-government ... [and protecting]
both the tribes and the gaming public from unscrupulous persons.
Id. at 1-2, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3071.
83. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
84. Id. at 209; see supra note 33 (addressing the civil/regulatory criminal/prohibitory
dichotomy and applying it to the regulation of Indian gaming). The Court explained that
"[t]he shorthand test is whether the conduct at issue violates the State's public policy."
Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209. "In light of the fact that California permits a substantial amount
of gambling activity, including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its state
lottery, we must conclude that California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in gen-
eral and bingo in particular." Id. at 211 (footnote omitted).
85. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209 (explaining that the Ninth Circuit applied the same per-
suasive analysis used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Semi-
nole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982)).
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tion.86 Because Public Law 28087 confers state jurisdiction over criminal
activities within state borders, the courts were required to evaluate reser-
vation gambling in light of existing state gambling laws and public policy
to determine if it was a criminal activity.88 The existence of state statutes
permitting and regulating gambling compelled the courts to conclude that
gambling was not a prohibited criminal activity, but was a state-regulated,
civil activity.89 Thus, states could not invoke jurisdiction via Public Law
280 to regulate tribal gambling. 9
The civil/regulatory criminal/prohibitory dichotomy adopted by the
Supreme Court is significant because it provides certain states91 with a
86. Id. The Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's application of the civil/regulatory
criminal/prohibitory dichotomy in deciding "that neither the State nor the county had any
authority to enforce its gambling laws within the reservations." Id. at 206.
87. See supra note 33.
88. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Public Law 280 was enacted to prevent lawlessness on Indian reservations. Id. at
208. It initially provided six states-Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and
Wisconsin-with criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over Indian tribes. Haslam, supra
note 33, at 176 n.68. Public Law 280 also allowed any other state to assume jurisdiction via
statute or state constitutional amendment. Id. at 176. Currently, Arizona, Florida, Idaho,
Iowa, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, and Washington have assumed partial or
total jurisdiction under this provision. Id. at 176 n.69; see also supra note 33 (discussing in
greater detail Public Law 280); infra note 92 (setting forth the current codified version of
Public Law 280).
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mechanism 92 for obtaining jurisdiction,93 subject to Indian consent, over
certain activities on Indian country.94 Similarly, Congress recognized the
value of this analysis in determining the extent of federal regulation over
the types of games permitted under IGRA.95 The Senate Select Commit-
tee on Indian Affairs, however, stressed that the application of the civil/
regulatory criminal/prohibitory dichotomy to S. 555 was "markedly differ-
ent ' '96 than that under Public Law 280. The analysis under S. 555 should
assist the judiciary in distinguishing "between a State's civil and criminal
laws to determine whether a body of law is applicable, as a matter of
Federal law, to either allow or prohibit certain activities." 97 Courts cur-
92. The mechanism for state exercise of criminal jurisdiction is codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162(a) (1988) and provides for state jurisdiction over
offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country listed...
to the same extent that such State ... has jurisdiction over offenses committed
elsewhere within the State ... and the criminal laws of such State ... shall have
the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere
within the State.
18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1988); see also supra note 33 (discussing Public Law 280).
The mechanism for state civil jurisdiction is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988) and
provides for state jurisdiction over
civil causes of action between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise
in the areas of Indian country listed ... to the same extent that such State has
jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such State that
are of general application to private persons or private property shall have the
same force and effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within
the State.
28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988); see also supra note 33 (discussing Public Law 280). Under 25
U.S.C. § 1326, however, the Indians affected by such state jurisdiction must consent in an
election "by a majority vote of the adult Indians voting at a special election." Id. None
have done so since the provision's enactment.
93. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 208 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976),
which states that the civil jurisdictional grant of Public Law 280 section 4 is conferred to
the states when the state law enforced is criminal in nature).
94. Id. at 207. " 'Indian country,'" as defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1151, includes "all land
Within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Gov-
ernment, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running
through the reservation." 18 U.S.C. § 115(a) (1988). This definition applies to questions of
both criminal and civil jurisdiction. DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427
n.2 (1975). Thus, the Cabazon and Morongo Reservations are Indian country. It should be
noted that IGRA adopted a slightly different term, Indian lands, and definition. See 25
U.S.C. § 2703(4) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). "Indian lands" is defined as:
(A) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and
(B) any lands title to which is either held in trust by the United States for the
benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual
subject to restriction by the United States against alienation and over which an
Indian tribe exercises governmental power.
Id.
95. S. REp. No. 446, supra note 79, at 6, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3076.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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rently apply the Cabazon analysis conjunctively with IGRA to evaluate
what Class III games should be included in compact negotiations.98 Thus,
the Cabazon decision has become an essential element of IGRA in that it
provides a framework for determining the scope of both state and federal
regulation over Indian gaming.
A. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians
In California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,9 9 two federally rec-
ognized Indian tribes, the Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indi-
ans, operated bingo games on their reservations in Riverside County,
California, pursuant to federally approved tribal ordinances.100 The
Cabazon Band also operated card parlor games for profit that were
played primarily by the non-Indian public. 101 These activities were a ma-
jor source of employment and the sole source of income for the Tribes."
0 2
Fearing organized crime involvement in tribal gaming activities, the State
of California and Riverside County sought to regulate the gambling activ-
ities on Indian country by enforcing California Penal Code Ann.
§ 326.5103 via Public Law 280,"° the Organized Crime Control Act of
98. See, e.g., Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1032 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 975 (1991); United States v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe,
897 F.2d 358, 368 (8th Cir. 1990); Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson,
No. CIV-S-92-812GEB, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9877, at *21 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 1993) (ex-
plaining the mechanics of the conjunctive application of Cabazon to IGRA). The district
court applied a two-step analysis to determine if the proposed Class Ill games are the
proper subject of a Tribal-State compact. Rumsey Indian, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9877, at
*21. First, the court must decide whether a state permits the proposed activity to be played
"'for any purpose by any person.' " Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (1988)). If the
proposed game is permitted, the analysis stops and the game is deemed a proper subject of
a Tribal-State compact. Id. If the proposed game is not permitted by the state, the court
will employ the Cabazon analysis to determine if the game violates state public policy. Id.
Thus, the court examines a state's entire statutory scheme to determine if the activity is
regulated or prohibited. Id.
99. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
100. Id. at 204. The Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Indians operated bingo games
pursuant to ordinances approved by the United States Secretary of the Interior. Id. at 205.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. Section 326.5 of the California Penal Code does not completely prohibit bingo.
Id. It permits bingo as long as the operators are members of designated charitable organi-
zations and are not compensated for their services. Id.
104. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 205; see 18 U.S.C. § 1162,28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) (granting California and five other states jurisdiction over criminal offenses commit-
ted by or against Indians on Indian lands within the states' borders); see supra note 33
(discussing the application of Public Law 280 to regulating activities on reservations).
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1970105 (OCCA), and two county gaming ordinances. 10 6 Although Cali-
fornia permitted certain charities to operate bingo parlors, prizes were
capped at $250 per game.'0 7 Tribal jackpots, however, exceeded this
limit.'0 8 Because this gaming would have been illegal if not conducted on
the reservation," 9 California claimed that its regulations prohibited this
activity and employed Public Law 280110 and OCCA'1 ' to obtain
jurisdiction.
The tribes sued Riverside County in federal district court seeking a de-
claratory judgment that the county lacked authority to enforce its gam-
bling laws on the reservation.'
12 The State of California intervened.
113
The district court agreed with the tribes and granted their motion for
summary judgment.
1' 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
summary judgment and permanent injunction restraining Riverside
County and the State of California from applying their gambling laws on
the reservations." 5 The United States Supreme Court upheld the deci-
sion.' 16 Writing for the Court, Justice White recognized the supremacy of
the federal interest in promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic de-
velopment.'1 7 Justice White found that, absent express congressional
consent, states may not apply their laws to tribal Indians on their reserva-
tions.' 1 8 The Court then rejected California's contention that Public Law
105. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 205; see 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
106. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 206. The county gaming ordinances included local Ordi-
nance No. 558, which regulated bingo, and Ordinance No. 331, which prohibited draw
poker and other card games. Id.
107. Id. at 205.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 202.
110. Id. at 203.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 202.
113. Id. at 206.
114. Id. at 202.
115. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 783 F.2d 900, 906 (9th
Cir. 1986), aff'd, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
116. Cabazon. 480 U.S. at 206.
117. Id. at 216. Justice White identified the overriding federal goal of promoting tribal
economic development and self-sufficiency. Id. Justice White wrote:
[The] [d]ecision in this case turns on whether state authority is pre-empted by the
operation of federal law; and "[s]tate jurisdiction is pre-empted ... if it interferes
or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless
the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,
334 (1983)).
118. Id. at 207.
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280 and OCCA constituted congressional consent to regulate tribal gam-
ing activity. 119
B. Overview of IGRA's General Provisions
In response to the rapid increase of high-stakes bingo activities on tri-
bal reservations during the late 1970s and early 1980s, Congress enacted
IGRA on October 17, 1988.12' Arriving on the heels of the Supreme
Court's decision in Cabazon,121 IGRA codified the federal government's
Indian policy goal of promoting strong tribal economic development, tri-
bal self-sufficiency, and strong tribal government. 122 IGRA established a
statutory basis for regulating and protecting tribal gaming operations' 23
119. Id.
120. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2721 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
121. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). It is interest-
ing to note that S. 555, the basis for IGRA, was introduced by Senator Daniel Inouye (D-
Haw. and Chairman on the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs), Senator Daniel
Evans (R-Wash.), and Senator Thomas Daschle (D-S.D. and a member of the Senate Se-
lect Committee on Indian Affairs) six days prior to the Cabazon decision. S. REP. No. 446,
supra note 79, at 4, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3074. At the time Cabazon was
decided, tribes feared that an adverse ruling by the United States Supreme Court would
affect negatively their position on the proposed bill and became more willing to compro-
mise. Id. at 4, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3073. Tribes originally were opposed to
any legislation over gambling that unilaterally conferred jurisdiction to states and ex-
pressed a "preference for an outright ban of class III games to any direct grant of jurisdic-
tion to States." Id. at 4, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3074. H.R. 1920 reflected this
and sought to ban Class III gaming altogether. Id.; see also note 79 (discussing H.R. 1920).
S. 555 took into account the tribes' position but also gave them the option to come under
state jurisdiction in the event they wanted to conduct Class III gaming. Id. at 4, reprinted
in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3074. The mechanism to accomplish this is the Tribal-State com-
pact. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3075-76; see infra notes 134-44 and accom-
panying text (discussing Tribal-State compacts).
122. See 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4) (1988); see also Haslam, supra note 33, at 178 n.98 (identi-
fying the 1960s as the period when the federal policy goal of encouraging tribal economic
independence and self-government emerged).
123. 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (1988). The Act's declaration of policy sets forth the purposes of
the Act:
(1) to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as
a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong
tribal governments;
(2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an Indian tribe
adequate to shield it from organized crime and other corrupting influences, to
ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation,
and to assure that gaming is conducted fairly and honestly by both the operator
and players; and
(3) to declare that the establishment of independent Federal regulatory au-
thority for gaming on Indian lands, the establishment of Federal standards for
gaming on Indian lands, and the establishment of a National Indian Gaming
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and created the National Indian Gaming Commission 124 (NIGC) to over-
see Indian gaming.' 25 IGRA also provides a jurisdictional scheme over
Indian gaming based on the type of game involved.' 26 This scheme pro-
vides for exclusive tribal jurisdiction over Class I gaming, 127 characterized
as social1 28 or traditional;12 9 and shared control with NIGC over Class II
gaming, 130 involving certain card and bingo-type games of chance.13 1 To
conduct Class II gaming, the tribal government must adopt a gaming or-
dinance and obtain approval from the NIGC Chairman.1
3 2
Commission are necessary to meet congressional concerns regarding gaming and
to protect such gaming as a means of generating tribal revenue.
Id.
124. 25 U.S.C. § 2704 (1988). The NIOC is established within the Department of the
Interior. Id. § 2704(a). The composition of NIGC is as follows:
(1) The Commission shall be composed of three full-time members who shall
be appointed as follows:
(A) a Chairman, who shall be appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate; and
(B) two associate members who shall be appointed by the Secretary of the
Interior.
(2)(A) The Attorney General shall conduct a background investigation on any
person considered for appointment to the Commission.
(B) The Secretary shall publish in the Federal Register the name and other
information the Secretary deems pertinent regarding a nominee for membership
on the Commission and shall allow a period of not less than thirty days for receipt
of public comment.
(3) Not more than two members of the Commission shall be of the same polit-
ical party. At least two members of the Commission shall be enrolled members
of any Indian tribe.
Id. § 2704(b)(1) to (3).
125. 25 U.S.C. § 2706 (1988). Powers of the NIGC include: the assessment and collec-
tion of civil fines for IGRA violations; the monitoring, inspection, and examination of tri-
bal premises and Class II gaming activity; the investigation of the backgrounds of gaming
personnel; the promulgation of guidelines and regulations, as appropriate; and the submis-
sion of biannual reports to Congress. Id.
126. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988).
127. Id. § 2710(a)(1) (providing absolute tribal control over Class I gaming).
128. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (identifying social games as games with
prize awards of minimal value).
129. Id. (identifying gaming as games connected with tribal ceremonies or
celebrations).
130. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (providing for tribal regulation of Class II gaming subject to
NIGC approval and statutory compliance).
131. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7) (including bingo, assisted by electronic, computer, or other
technological means, and card games played in conformity with state law).
132. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1)(B). IGRA requires that for an ordinance for Class II gam-
ing to be approved by the NIGC Chairman, the tribe must have sole proprietary responsi-
bility for the gaming conducted. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(A). Further, net gaming revenues must
be used: "(i) to fund tribal government operations or programs; (ii) to provide for the
general welfare of the Indian tribe and its members; (iii) to promote tribal economic devel-
opment; (iv) to donate to charitable organizations; or (v) to help fund operations of local
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IGRA's most controversial aspect is allowing tribes to conduct Class
III, or high-stakes, gaming.133 Lawful Class III gaming activity is con-
ducted pursuant to an approved tribal gaming ordinance, located in a
state that permits this type of gambling, and executed in conformance
with a Tribal-State compact entered into between a tribe and the state.
134
1. Tribal-State Compact
Although S. 555 recognized primary tribal jurisdiction over card parlor
operations and bingo, it vested oversight powers in the newly created
NIGC.13 5 S. 555 also authorized tribal and state governments to enter
into Tribal-State compacts to address the regulatory and jurisdictional is-
sues of Class III casino, parimutuel, and slot machine gaming.1 36 The leg-
islature's purpose in requiring a Tribal-State compact for the operation of
government agencies." Id. § 2710(b)(2)(B). Additional statutory requirements include an-
nual external audits, construction of the facility in conformance with environmental and
public health and safety concerns, and the implementation of a system to adequately per-
form background investigations on primary management officials and key employees. Id.
§ 2710(b)(2)(C) to (F). Congress included this last requirement in response to serious con-
cerns regarding Mafia involvement in Indian gaming activity. See Eric J. Swanson, Com-
ment, The Reservation Gaming Craze: Casino Gambling Under the Indian Gaming and
Regulatory Act of 1988, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 471, 482 (1992) (emphasizing Congress' fear
of organized crime involvement in Indian gaming activity as a significant reason for
IGRA's passage).
133. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d). In the first major case interpreting IGRA, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit included as Class III gaming high-stakes casino
style gambling such as blackjack, poker, dice, money-wheels, roulette, baccarat, chick-a-
luck, pan game, over and under, and bouncing ball. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Con-
necticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1027 n.5 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 975 (1991). From the
Indian perspective, the most controversial aspect of IGRA was the imposition of federal
and state restrictions on tribal governmental powers. See Red Lake Band of Chippewa
Indians v. Swimmer, 740 F. Supp. 9, 11 (D.D.C. 1990).
134. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d). Section 2710(d) states that Class III gaming may lawfully be
conducted on Indian lands if such activities are-
(A) authorized by an ordinance or resolution that-
(i) is adopted by the governing body of the Indian tribe having jurisdic-
tion over such lands,
(ii). meets the requirements of subsection (b) of this section, and
(iii) is approved by the Chairman,
(B) located in a State that permits such gaining for any purpose by any person,
organization, or entity, and
(C) conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the
Indian tribe and the State.
Id. § 2710(d)(1).
135. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 79, at 16, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3073. In S.
555 the NIGC was to be composed of five members, but was later reduced to three. 25
U.S.C. § 2704.
136. See S. REP. No. 446, supra note 79, at 16, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3073;
Monteau, supra note 10, at 1.
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Class III gaming was to create a mechanism to balance the competing
interests of the tribes and the states. 137 Prior to IGRA's enactment, state
laws and regulations pertaining to Class III gambling generally did not
apply on the reservations. 13 8 States have a strong interest, however, in
maintaining their restrictions on Class III activities on tribal lands. 139 The
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs (Committee) balanced this
state interest with the competing tribal interest against imposition of state
jurisdiction over activities on tribal land. 4 ' The Committee also identi-
fied other significant tribal and state governmental interests regarding the
conduct of Class III gaming. 41 Thus, the effect of the Tribal-State com-
pact provision is to allow the state an opportunity to participate in the
regulation of Class III gaming on Indian land within its borders. 142
Another goal of the compact was to put the Indian tribes and the states
on equal footing by facilitating negotiations between two equal sover-
eigns. 43 The Committee recognized, however, the difficulty of creating
incentives for states to enter into negotiations with tribes to conclude
compacts for Class III gaming. 44 The Committee's solution was to en-
137. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 79, at 13, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3083. The
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs sought "to balance the need for sound enforce-
ment of gaming laws and regulations, with the strong Federal interest in preserving the
sovereign rights of tribal governments to regulate activities and enforce laws on Indian
land." Id. at 5, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3075. The Committee determined that
the Tribal-State compact was the best mechanism available to the tribes and the states "to
assure that the interests of both sovereign entities are met with respect to the regulation of
complex gaming enterprises such as parimutuel horse and dog racing, casino gaming, jai
alai and so forth." Id. at 13, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3083. But see Jones, supra
note 12, at 134-35 (noting that the mandatory compact requirement "in reality aggravated
conflicting notions of sovereignty in the context of historic adversity").
138. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 79, at 13, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3083.
139. Id.
140. Id. The tribes' opposition to any encroachment on their sovereignty was so great
that some advocated "an outright ban of class III games." Id. at 4, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3074.
141. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3083. Tribe governmental interests
include: (1) raising revenues to provide governmental services to benefit the tribe; (2) pro-
moting public safety and lawfulness on tribal land; (3) attaining tribal economic self-suffi-
ciency; (4) attaining Indian self-determination; and (5) regulating people within tribal
borders. Id. State governmental interests relating to Class III gaming conducted on Indian
lands within state borders include interaction of Class III gaming with the states' own pub-
lic policy, safety, law, and economic interests. Id.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The Committee stated, "The practical problem in formulating statutory lan-
guage to accomplish the desired result is the need to provide some incentive for States to
negotiate with tribes in good faith because tribes will be unable to enter into such gaming
unless a compact is in place." Id.
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able tribes to sue states in federal district court for refusing to engage in
good faith negotiations.
145
2. Statutory Process for Compact Conclusion
Pursuant to section 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) of IGRA, an Indian tribe may file
suit in federal district court against a state for failing to enter into negoti-
ations to conclude a compact or for failing to conduct such negotiations in
good faith.146 Such an action may be initiated after the passage of a 180-
day period commencing on the date the tribes sought state participation
in negotiations. 147 To establish its prima facie case, the tribe must intro-
duce evidence that a Tribal-State compact has not been concluded and
that the state ignored the request or did not respond in good faith.1a The
burden of proof then shifts to the state to demonstrate that it negotiated
in good faith to conclude a compact.' 49 If the state fails to meet this bur-
den, the court will order a compact to be concluded within 60 days.1
5 0
In the event that the 60-day period expires without the tribe and state
concluding a compact, the tribe and state each must submit their best
compact offer to a court-appointed mediator who decides which compact
is to be adopted. 5 ' If the state consents to the compact proposed by the
mediator within 60 days of its submission to the state, the agreement pro-
posed by the mediator is to be treated as a Tribal-State compact.152 If the
state does not consent to the mediated compact, the state is removed
from the process and the Secretary of the Interior works with the tribe to
prescribe the appropriate procedures for engaging in Class III gaming.1
53
C. Judicial Interpretation of IGRA
The Supreme Court's decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mis-
sion Indians154 and the subsequent passage of IGRA spawned an unprec-
145. Id. at 14, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3084. The Committee recognized that
in agreeing to conclude a compact for Class III gaming with a state, a tribe relinquishes any
existing legal right to conduct Class III gaming if they chose not to engage in gaming rather
than accede to state jurisdiction, or if they chose to negotiate a compact and it was never
concluded. Id.
146. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
147. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i).
148. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii).
149. Id.
150. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii).
151. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).
152. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(v), (vi).
153. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii).
154. 480 U.S. 202 (1987); see also Bisset, supra note 14, at 74 (explaining that by requir-
ing express congressional consent for application of state and local law to Indian gaming,
the Supreme Court in Cabazon provided judicial support for this activity). The Cabazon
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edented growth in gambling activities on tribal lands.' 55 In the absence
of an established regulatory framework for determining the finer points
of the new law, however, tribes and states were forced to turn to the
judiciary for interpretation. 56 Tribes actively sought judicial assistance to
conclude Tribal-State compacts, 57 while states sought to avoid judicial
intervention in the compact negotiation process by asserting the soverign
immunity defense afforded by the Eleventh Amendment. 15
1. Tribal Victories
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut provided the most significant
judicial interpretation of IGRA's good faith requirement that states con-
clude a compact.' 59 The Pequots invoked IGRA's statutory remedy by
bringing suit against Connecticut for refusing to negotiate a compact.
160
The State could not satisfy its burden of proof regarding good faith nego-
tiation because it had completely refused to negotiate.' 61 Instead, Con-
necticut argued that IGRA required tribes to adopt ordinances allowing
decision ultimately eliminated state control of Indian gambling without imposing federal
restraints. Id. Although IGRA repealed the application of the Johnson Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 1175, prohibiting the use or possession of any gambling device) to Class III gambling
devices subject to an effective Tribal-State compact, the Johnson Act remains applicable to
Class II gaming on Indian lands. See Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. National Indian
Gaming Comm'n, 14 F.3d 633, 635 n.3 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2709 (1994)
(making it unlawful for video facsimiles of games to be regulated as Class I1 gaming
devices).
155. See Bisset, supra note 14, at 74 (discussing the rapid growth of Indian gaming);
Swanson, supra note 132, at 471 (noting the subsequent nationwide increase of casino-style
gambling on reservations); see also supra part I.B (discussing IGRA's impact on tribal and
state economies).
156. Numerous tribes filed lawsuits in federal district court to compel states' good faith
negotiations. See infra parts II.C.1, II.C.2 (discussing the cases in which tribes sued states
pursuant to IGRA).
157. See infra part II.C.I.
158. See discussion infra parts II.C.2, III. States also sought clarification on what spe-
cific kinds of gaming are permissible as Class II or Class III gaming. See, e.g., Oneida Tribe
v. Wisconsin, 951 F.2d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 1991) (defining" 'lotto'" as a Class II game which
may be prohibited but cannot be regulated by the state).
159. 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 975 (1991).
160. Id. at 1025.
161. Id.; see Nancy McKay, Comment, The Meaning of Good Faith in the Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act, 27 GONz. L. REV. 471, 477 (1992) (discussing the Second Circuit's
interpretation that IGRA mandates good faith negotiations between states and tribes).
Because little case law regarding the good faith standard exists under IGRA, McKay pro-
poses four possible meanings of good faith. Id. at 477-78. The first standard is the reason-
able subjective standard within the context of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Id.
at 478. The second is the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) standard of good faith,
which combines a totality of the circumstances approach with a per se violation standard.
Id. at 478-79. The third is the totality of the circumstances test employed by the Washing-
ton State Supreme Court for determining good faith bargaining in the public sector. Id.
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Class III gaming prior to negotiation with a state. 62 The United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut agreed with the Pequot
Tribe that IGRA does not require sequential adherence to the conditions
outlined in 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) and, thus, adoption of a tribal ordi-
nance is not a prerequisite for tribal-state negotiations. 163 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed," 6 emphasizing
that a state's duty to enter into good faith negotiations is triggered when a
tribe submits its request to enter into negotiations to conclude a tribal-
state gaming compact.'
65
The Second Circuit also affirmed the district court's application of the
Cabazon analysis. 66 Because Connecticut permitted casino-style gam-
bling conducted by charities, Class III gaming could not be considered
prohibited. 67 The Second Circuit concluded that because the activity
was regulated by the State, it was not violative of public policy.168 Thus,
Connecticut was required to negotiate a compact with the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe.'
69
In Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota,7 ° the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion denying the Sioux Tribe's request to compel South Dakota to con-
clude a compact. 171  South Dakota had engaged in five formal
negotiations with the Cheyenne River Sioux between February and Au-
gust 1991.172 The negotiations broke down over the Cheyenne River
Sioux's interest in: (1) obtaining higher bet limits than those permitted by
the State; (2) conducting Keno and other casino games prohibited under
other Tribal-State compacts; and (3) obtaining compacts for two off-reser-
The fourth is the objective standard employed by the insurance industry when negotiating
contracts. Id. at 481-82.
162. Mashantucket Pequot, 913 F.2d at 1027.
163. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 737 F. Supp. 169, 171 (D. Conn.)
(granting tribe's motion for summary judgment), aff'd, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 975 (1991).
164. Mashantucket Pequot, 913 F.2d at 1024.
165. Id. at 1028 (stating that "the only condition precedent to negotiation specified by
the IGRA is a request by a tribe that a state enter into negotiations").
166. Id. at 1030.
167. Id. at 1031.
168. Id. at 1029 (citing California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202
(1990)). The Court held that Connecticut permitted Class III gaming" 'for any purpose by
any person, organization, or entity' within the meaning of section 2710(d)(1)(B)" of
IGRA. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (1988)).
169. Id. at 1032.
170. 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993).
171. Id. at 281.
172. Id. at 276.
19941
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 44:279
vation locations.173 The United States District Court for the District of
South Dakota acknowledged South Dakota's duty to engage in good faith
negotiations with the Sioux, but found insufficient evidence that South
Dakota had not bargained in good faith.
174
The district court also held that the Tenth and Eleventh Amend-
ments' 75 did not bar the court from exercising jurisdiction over the dis-
pute. 76 The court noted the different treatment by circuit courts as to
whether the Eleventh Amendment barred suits brought under IGRA.177
It held that because the tribes sought neither monetary nor injunctive
relief against the State, South Dakota could not assert its Eleventh
Amendment immunity.178 Regarding the Tenth Amendment, the district
court noted that "IGRA does not force states to negotiate compacts,"'1
79
but rather provides a series of alternatives under section 2710(d)(7). 18 °
The Eighth Circuit also found that the Eleventh Amendment did not
preclude federal jurisdiction. 181 The court of appeals followed the rea-
soning of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.82 In Seminole Tribe, the district
court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not preclude IGRA actions
against the state.'83 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit in Cheyenne River Sioux
173. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 830 F. Supp. 523,527 (D.S.D), aff'd,
3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993).
174. Id. at 527; see also Monteau, supra note 10, at 6 (stating that by the time of this
decision, South Dakota had concluded seven Tribal-State compacts with other tribes cover-
ing blackjack, poker, slot machine, and video lottery games).
175. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text (discussing whether the Eleventh
Amendment bars suits brought by tribes against states).
176. Cheyenne River Sioux, 830 F. Supp. at 525-26.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 526; see supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text (discussing whether the
Eleventh Amendment bars suits brought by tribes against states).
179. Cheyenne River Sioux, 830 F. Supp. at 526.
180. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."); supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text (discussing states' use of the
Eleventh Amendment as a bar to suits brought by tribes); see also Timothy Joranko et al.,
"Good Faith" Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, in SPEAKING THE TRUTH, supra
note 10, at doc. 7, at 1 (explaining the states' options at each juncture under 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d)(7) and the tribes' access to federal procedures available under the statute).
States may avail themselves of several alternatives in negotiating over Class Ill gaming.
Id. States may refuse to negotiate at all and risk federal district court suit by the tribe. Id.
States may decide to default at which -time they have an additional 60 days to conclude a
compact. Id. States may continue to refuse to negotiate or conclude a compact and be
subject to a mediator's decision. Id.
181. Cheyenne River Sioux v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d. 273, 280 (8th Cir. 1993).
182. Id. at 280-81; see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 658 (S.D. Fla. 1992),
rev'd, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994).
183. Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. at 658.
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recognized that Congress abrogated state Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity by enacting IGRA pursuant to its constitutional power under the
Indian Commerce Clause.184 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit noted the
important state interest in active negotiation of tribal compacts to super-
vise Indian gaming within state borders.
185
In Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington,186 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the Eighth Circuit and held
that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal courts from exercis-
ing jurisdiction over states pursuant to IGRA. 187 The Ninth Circuit re-
versed the district court's dismissal of the suit on Eleventh Amendment
grounds.' 8 8 The Spokane court explained that Congress not only in-
tended to abrogate state sovereign immunity by enacting IGRA, but also
possessed the constitutional power to do so under the Indian Commerce
Clause. 189
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that those federal courts that addressed
the issue190 concede that IGRA's language evidences a clear intent by
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity by authorizing suit in fed-
eral court for injunctive relief.'9 ' The Ninth Circuit also explained that
Congress' constitutional power to abrogate state immunity from suits de-
rives from the Indian Commerce Clause."9 Following the United States
Supreme Court's analysis in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. ,193 the Spo-
kane court held that Congress' plenary power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to the Commerce Clause applied equally to the In-
dian Commerce Clause.
194
184. Cheyenne River Sioux, 3 F.3d at 280.
185. Id. at 281.
186. 28 F.3d 991 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S. Aug. 29,1994)
(No. 94-357).
187. Id. at 996.
188. Id. at 998.
189. Id. at 995-98
190. Id. at 994-95 (citing Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273, 281
(8th Cir. 1993) and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1024 (11th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. July 1, 1994) (No. 94-12)).
191. Id. at 995 (discussing section 2710(d) of IGRA).
192. Id.
193. 491 U.S. 1 (1989); see infra notes 277-82 and accompanying text (discussing the
Union Gas decision).
194. Spokane, 28 F.3d at 994-95.
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2. Tribal Defeat: Seminole Tribe v. Florida and Poarch Band of
Creek Indians v. Alabama
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit consoli-
dated two cases, Seminole Tribe v. Florida95 and Poarch Band of Creek
Indians v. Alabama, 96 and decided that the Indian Commerce Clause did
not give Congress the power to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity.' 97 This decision allowed Alabama and Florida to refuse to ne-
gotiate with tribes over Class III gaming.198
The Seminole and Poarch Tribes initiated separate suits in federal dis-
trict courts pursuant to section 2710(d)(7)(A)(i), alleging that the States
had refused to enter into good faith negotiations to conclude compacts
regarding Class III gaming.199 In Poarch, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Alabama granted Alabama's motion to
dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.2 °° Con-
versely, in Seminole Tribe, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida denied the State's motion to dismiss on Eleventh
Amendment grounds.20' Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Poarch and
reversed Seminole Tribe.z 0
By holding that states lawfully may not be subject to federal district
court jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit denied the tribes access to the
most powerful remedy available under IGRA. Specifically, the Eleventh
Circuit recognized that tribes may not avail themselves of the remedial
195. 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992), rev'd, 11 F.3d .1016 (11th Cir. 1994).
196. 776 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. Ala. 1991), dismissed, 784 F. Supp. 1549 (S.D. Ala. 1992),
aff'd, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. July 1, 1994)
(No. 94-12).
197. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1019 (11th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 63
U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. July 1, 1994) (No. 94-12).
198. Id. at 1029.
199. Id. at 1020-21.
200. Id. at 1021. The Poarch Band of Creek Indians initially brought suit against the
State of Alabama and the Governor of Alabama. Id. The district court dismissed the suit
against the State, Poarch, 776 F. Supp. at 550 (Poarch I), and also against the Governor,
784 F. Supp. 1549 (S.D. Ala. 1992) (Poarch 11), on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Semi-
nole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1021.
201. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1020. The Seminole Tribe sued the State of Florida and
the Governor of Florida. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992),
rev'd, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994). In this case, however, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida denied the State's motion to dismiss on Eleventh
Amendment grounds. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1020. Consequently, the State of Florida
filed an interlocutory appeal. Id.
202. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1029.
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procedures outlined in sections 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) 203 and (B)(i)-(vi), 20 4 un-
less states' waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity.205 Furthermore,
the court explicitly identified section 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) as the appropri-
ate remedy for tribes when states refuse to negotiate and to consent to
federal district court jurisdiction.2 6 This remedy effectively places gov-
ernance of Class III gaming in the hands of the Secretary of the Interior
after the expiration of 180 days triggered by dismissal of the lawsuit in
federal district court,20 7
3. Attempts to Establish a Good Faith Standard
Until recently, many states successfully argued that the Tenth and Elev-
enth Amendments bar federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction
over them. Consequently, there is little case law interpreting IGRA's
good faith standard.20 8 District court decisions that address states' duties
to negotiate in good faith with tribes include Lac du Flambeau Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin20 9 and Yavapai-Prescott In-
dian Tribe v. Arizona.210 While neither decision fully addressed an ap-
propriate good faith standard,2 ' the United States District Court for the
203. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text (explaining IGRA's remedial
scheme).
204. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text (explaining IGRA's remedial
scheme).
205. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1029. The Eleventh Circuit, however, recognized that
when a state consents to suit, the provisions of section 2710 remain in effect. Id. at 1029
n.15 (citing Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson. No. CIV-S-92-
812GEB, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9877, at *9 n.5 (E.D. Cal. July 16, 1993) as a case in which
defendants waived Eleventh Amendment immunity).
206. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1029. The Eleventh Circuit interpreted IGRA to re-
quire tribes to wait 180 days before bringing suit in federal district court against states, to
wait for dismissal based on the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense,
to notify the Secretary of the Interior of the states' failure to conclude a compact, and to
rely on the Secretary of the Interior to prescribe regulations governing Class Ill gaming on
the tribes' reservations. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Crowell & Straus, supra note 13, at 2-3 (identifying states that invoked Tenth
and Eleventh Amendment defenses to the obligation to negotiate in good faith with
tribes); Ahola, supra note 16, at 911-12. Fortunately, some cases were decided in favor of
the tribes on appeal, and thus, some guidance as to the standard of good faith required in
negotiations under IGRA may be forthcoming. See Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d
1422, 1432 (10th Cir.) (agreeing with the Eighth and Ninth Circuit and holding that "the
Indian Commerce Clause empowers Congress to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity and that IGRA constitutes an unequivocal expression of Congress' intent
to do so"), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 2176 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1994) (No. 94-1029).
209. 770 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wis. 1991), appeal dismissed, 957 F.2d 515 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 91 (1992).
210. 796 F. Supp. 1292 (D. Ariz. 1992).
211. See McKay, supra note 161, at 474.
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Western District of Wisconsin in Wisconsin Winnebago Nation v. Thomp-
son212 recently attempted to define the standards of good faith.213
The facts of Lac du Flambeau did not require the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Wisconsin to articulate a standard
of good faith.214 The State of Wisconsin acknowledged its refusal to ne-
gotiate certain Class III gaming activities.215 Wisconsin stipulated that if
the court found that IGRA mandated negotiation of these activities, then
the State would admit its failure to negotiate in good faith.216 Wiscon-
sin's qualification removed many issues from the case, narrowing the
scope of the opinion.217
The court ordered Wisconsin to conclude a compact with the tribe.218
Lac du Flambeau thus informed states that if they generally allow lotter-
ies with "elements of prize, chance and consideration," '219 tribes are free
to negotiate any type of Class III gambling activity regulated by the
state.22 °
In Yavapai-Prescott,221 the Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe brought suit
against the State of Arizona after negotiations to conclude a compact
stalled.22 2 The dispute centered on the scope of Class III gaming activity
permitted within Arizona and Arizona's duty to include various forms of
Class III gaming activity in a Tribal-State compact.2 23 Arizona wanted to
exclude casino and video gaming from the Tribal-State compact, while the
Yavapai-Prescott wanted to include these games.224
The Yavapai-Prescott wanted the court to apply the Cabazon civil/reg-
ulatory criminal/prohibitory dichotomy 225 to Class III gaming as Mashan-
tucket Pequot2 2 6 and Lac du Flambeau had done.2 2 7 The United States
District Court for the District of Arizona declined to apply the Cabazon
212. 824 F. Supp. 167 (W.D. Wis. 1993), aff'd, 22 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 1994).
213. Id. at 172.
214. Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 484; see supra note 161.
215. Lac du Flambeau, 770 F. Supp. at 481.
216. Id. at 484.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 488.
219. Id. at 487.
220. Id.
221. Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 1292 (D. Ariz. 1992).
222. Id. at 1294.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209-11 (1987); see
supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text (discussing the civil/regulatory criminal/prohibi-
tory dichotomy).
226. 913 F.2d 1024, 1029-32 (2d Cir. 1990).
227. Yavapai-Prescott, 796 F. Supp. at 1294.
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test.22 Writing for the court, Judge Rosenblatt concluded that Lac du
Flambeau inappropriately applied the civil/regulatory criminal/prohibi-
tory dichotomy to Wisconsin law as a basis for good faith negotiations.
229
Instead, the court followed Mashantucket Pequot, holding that once Class
III gaming is found to be civil/regulatory in the federal scheme, the type
of games discussed should be open and negotiations unlimited in accord-
ance with federal law.23° Furthermore, Judge Rosenblatt held that Lac
du Flambeau went too far in ordering Wisconsin, which had negotiated in
good faith with the Lac du Flambeau tribe, to conclude a compact.231 He
stated that the court could order conclusion of a compact only if it found
that the State had failed in its duty to negotiate in good faith.232
In Wisconsin Winnebago Nation v. Thompson, 33 the Winnebago Tribe
sued the Governor of Wisconsin for failing to negotiate a compact for a
new site.234 The Tribe and the State already had concluded a compact for
Class III gaming on the Tribe's existing gaming sites in June 1992.235
During the negotiation process for the 1992 compact, the Tribe requested
that a new site be included.236 Although the State of Wisconsin refused
to include the new site, the compact was concluded.237
The Tribe argued that it was entitled to decide unilaterally where it
could engage in gaming on its lands and that site selection was not open
to negotiation.238 The United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Wisconsin disagreed, ruling that, absent any evidence to the con-
trary, the lack of a provision for gaming at the new site was a legitimate
concession made by the Tribe for concluding the compact. 239 The district
court also stated that because the new site was the subject of negotiation
for the June 1992 compact and was not included in the final agreement,
the Tribe was precluded from reopening negotiations on that issue with-
out the State's consent.240
The district court did not address whether a tribe may sue a state to
compel good faith negotiations once a compact is concluded.24' It did
228. Id. at 1295-96.




233. 824 F. Supp. 167 (W.D. Wis. 1993), aff'd, 22 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 1994).





239. Id. at 172.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 173.
19941
Catholic University Law Review
advise, however, that should a tribe wish to reserve negotiations over
gaming at another site for a future day, it should insist on such a provision
in the compact.242
III. IGRA JURISPRUDENCE: THE QUAGMIRE OF STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
The Second, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit decisions on
whether the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the states to compel
compact negotiations have a significant impact on the interpretation of
IGRA.243 The Second Circuit did not address the Eleventh Amendment
issue, but established that a state's refusal to negotiate was prima facie
evidence of a failure to negotiate in good faith. 44 Conversely, the Eighth
Circuit faced the Eleventh Amendment issue and decided that Congress
satisfied the two-prong test for abrogation when it enacted IGRA: Con-
gress expressly abrogated state sovereign immunity, and Congress had
the power to do so under the Indian Commerce Clause.245 The Eighth
Circuit, however, did not find sufficient evidence that the State failed to
bargain in good faith.2 46 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit concentrated on the
Eleventh Amendment issue, following the Eighth Circuit's rationale, and
found that Congress satisfied the two-prong test for abrogation.247 The
Tenth Circuit agreed with both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits that the
two-prong test was satisfied. 248 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit held that
242. Id.
243. See Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991 (9th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1994) (No. 94-357); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. July 1, 1994) (No.
94-12); Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993); Mashan-
tucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 975
(1991).
244. Mashantucket Pequot, 913 F.2d at 1024; see supra notes 75, 159-69 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Mashantucket Pequot case).
245. Cheyenne River Sioux, 3 F.3d at 280-81; see supra notes 170-85 and accompanying
text (discussing the Cheyenne River Sioux case).
246. Cheyenne River Sioux, 3 F.3d at 280-81.
247. Spokane, 28 F.3d at 994-95; see supra notes 186-94 (discussing the Spokane case).
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit's holding that IGRA satisfied only the first prong of the two-
prong test for abrogation of state sovereign immunity, the Ninth Circuit held that the sec-
ond prong is also satisfied by virtue of Congress' power under the Indian Commerce
Clause. Spokane, 28 F.3d at 995-96. The Ninth Circuit recognized that IGRA's language
requiring that states be subject to suit in federal court for failing to negotiate with tribes
satisfied the first prong-intent to abrogate. Id. at 994-95. The Ninth Circuit further ex-
plained that Congress satisfied the second prong-power to abrogate-by the enactment
of IGRA pursuant to its constitutionally granted plenary power to legislate in the field of
Indian affairs. Id. at 996-97.
248. Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1424 (10th Cir.) (consolidating four cases
in which tribes sought injunctions to compel Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Kansas to nego-
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although Congress clearly intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity,
it had not been granted power to do so under the Indian Commerce
Clause.2 49 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the tribes' suit and never
reached the good faith negotiation issue.250
Clearly, without a resolution of the constitutional question, courts are
not able to determine the good faith standard required under IGRA.251
A Supreme Court decision expressly recognizing Congress' power to ab-
rogate sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause would re-
solve the constitutional question, free the courts to determine a good
faith standard for tribal-state negotiations, and enable the courts to fash-
ion remedies for tribes when these negotiations fail. The Ninth and Tenth
Circuits' conflict with the Eleventh Circuit's decision on the issue provide
the United States Supreme Court with the opportunity to resolve the
question of whether Congress has to power the abrogate state sovereign
immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause.
A. The Eleventh Amendment Bar
Currently, a conflict exists among the circuits as to whether the Elev-
enth Amendment immunizes states from being subject to suit in federal
252court. 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in
tiate compacts pursuant to IGRA), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 2176 (U.S. Dec. 9,
1994) (No. 94-1029). The Ponca court thoroughly examined the states' Tenth and Eleventh
Amendment claims as well as the applicability of the Ex parte Young Doctrine. Id. 1427-
36. The court concluded that neither the Tenth nor the Eleventh Amendments barred
tribes from bringing suit against states under IGRA and that the Ex parte Young Doctrine
was inapplicable. Id.; see also infra note 256 and accompanying text (explaining the Ex
parte Young Doctrine).
249. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1027 (1 1th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 63
U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. July 1, 1994) (No. 94-12); see supra notes 195-207 (discussing the
Seminole case in depth).
250. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1022.
251. In Mashantucket Pequot, the Second Circuit determined that a refusal to negotiate
constituted bad faith. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1032 (2d
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 975 (1991). The court noted, however, that there is little
guidance, except that contained in section 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) for evaluating the elements of
good faith negotiation. Id. Some commentators advocate application of the good faith
standard used in the labor relations area. See McKay, supra note 161, at 477-82.
252. The appellate court decision validating states' use of the Eleventh Amendment
defense includes the combined decision in Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1016; see supra notes
195-207 (discussing the Seminole Tribe decision in depth).
Appellate court decisions refusing to permit the states to hide behind the shield of Elev-
enth Amendment immunity include: Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991
(9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1994) (No. 94-357), Chey-
enne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 3 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1993); Ponca Tribe v.
Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 2176 (U.S. Dec. 9,
1994) (No. 94-1029).
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Seminole Tribe v. Florida, held that the Eleventh Amendment bars states
from being subject to suit in federal court.253 In Seminole Tribe, the Elev-
enth Circuit held that unless one of three exceptions-consent,254 abro-
gation,255 or application of the Ex parte Young doctrine 25 6-apply, the
Eleventh Amendment prevents federal courts from exercising jurisdiction
over states being sued by tribes pursuant to section § 2710(d)(7).257 In
the context of IGRA, the abrogation exception is the one that applies in
most cases.258 The Eleventh Circuit applied the Supreme Court's two-
prong test to determine whether the criteria for abrogation is satisfied.259
253. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1019.
254. Id. The court discussed state power to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity by
expressly consenting to suit via legislative enactment, or by " 'plan of the convention' "
consent pursuant to the United States Constitution and state participation in a congres-
sional program. Id. at 1022. This type of consent must be "explicitly authorized by the
state 'in its Constitution, statutes and decisions.' " Id. (quoting Silver v. Baggiano, 804 F.2d
1211, 1214 (11th Cir. 1986)). The Eleventh Circuit noted, however, that "plan of the con-
vention" consent applied to states' surrender of sovereign immunity from suit by other
states on the basis of " 'mutuality of the concession.'" Id. (quoting Blatchford v. Native
Village, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991)). Because there is no mutuality of the concession with
foreign sovereigns or Indian tribes, "'[i]f the convention could not surrender the tribes'
immunity for the benefit of the States, we do not believe that it surrendered the States'
immunity for the benefit of the tribes.' " Id. (quoting Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 782).
The tribes contended that because states intend to reap the benefits of IGRA, they also
should suffer the detriment of being subject to suit in federal district court, and thus states
implicitly consent to federal jurisdiction. Id. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed and ex-
plained that if it adopted the tribes' argument, the states would be subject to suit under
IGRA both when the states refuse to negotiate and when the states consent to negotiate.
Id. at 1023.
255. Id. For Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity, two conditions must be
satisfied. Id. at 1024. First, it must clearly state its intent to subject states to federal district
court jurisdiction. Id. Second, it must have the power to abrogate. Id. The Eleventh
Circuit applied this test and determined that Congress' intent was clear, but that it did not
have the power to abrogate under the Indian Commerce Clause. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged Congress' power to abrogate state Eleventh
Amendment immunity pursuant to Article 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I
section 8, but refused to recognize congressional power to abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity pursuant to any other constitutional provision without Supreme Court precedent. Id.
at 1023-24. Thus, it disagreed with the tribes' argument that Congress abrogated state
sovereign immunity when it enacted section 2710(d) pursuant to the Indian Commerce
Clause. Id. at 1024.
256. Id. at 1028. The Ex parte Young doctrine permits a party to obtain a federal in-
junction against a state officer to comply with federal law. Id. Tribes have used this doc-
trine to sue state governors to force negotiations under the IGRA with mixed results. Id.
257. Id. at 1029.
258. See Jones, supra note 12, at 149 (explaining that although some Eleventh Amend-
ment disputes arise over the exceptions of consent and the Ex parte Young doctrine, the
majority involve the abrogation doctrine).
259. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1024. The Eleventh Circuit explained:
When determining whether Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity, we must conduct a two-part inquiry. We first must deter-
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The Eleventh Circuit held that because Congress intended to abrogate
states' immunity and expressed the intent explicitly in IGRA, the first
prong of the test is satisfied. 6 The court did not, however, find that
Congress possessed constitutional authority to abrogate states' immunity
because the Indian Commerce Clause does not confer this authority to
Congress.
261
Conversely, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits held that the Eleventh
Amendment does not immunize states from being subject to suit in fed-
eral court because the two prongs were satisfied.262 Both circuits found
that IGRA's language indicates Congress' clear intent to abrogate state
sovereign immunity and that Congress has the power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity via the Indian Commerce Clause.263
B. Congressional Intent to Abrogate States' Immunity
Most courts faced with the Eleventh Amendment issue have acknowl-
edged that the first prong, congressional intent to abrogate, is satisfied.26
Courts rely on the legislative history as well as the text of IGRA for gui-
dance on Congress' intent. IGRA's legislative history strongly supports
the conclusion that Congress enacted IGRA to establish a federal scheme
for the governance of Indian gaming activities. 265 The Committee was
concerned that some states would attempt to escape from negotiating
with tribes by invoking the Eleventh Amendment.266 Senators Inouye
and McCain alerted the National Governors Association to these con-
cerns and indicated that if the states were exhibiting their refusal to play a
role in regulating Class III Indian gaming, Congress' only alternative
mine that the "evidence of congressional intent [to abrogate the states' immunity
is] both unequivocal and textual." We also must find that Congress possessed the
power under the Constitution to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment sov-
ereign immunity.
Id. (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989)) (citations omitted); see also supra
note 255 (discussing the abrogation of sovereign immunity).
260. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1024.
261. Id.
262. See Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1428 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed,
63 U.S.L.W. 2176 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1994) (No. 94-1029); Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washing-
ton, 28 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir.) (holding that Congress constitutionally abrogated state
sovereign immunity by enacting IGRA pursuant to its power under the Indian Commerce
Clause), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1994) (No. 94-357).
263. Ponca, 37 F.3d at 1428; Spokane, 28 F.3d at 997.
264. See, e.g., Ponca, 37 F.3d at 1427 (aggregating six district court decisions); Seminole
Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1024.
265. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 79, at 6, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3076. The
Committee explained that Congress "intended to expressly preempt the field in the gov-
ernance of gaming activities on Indian lands." Id.
266. See Santoni, supra note 79, at 425-26.
19941
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would be to establish comprehensive federal regulation of Indian
gaming.
267
Without this explicit preemption, it would be disingenuous for IGRA
to allow tribes recourse to federal district courts to enforce section
2710(d)(7). Congress foresaw the difficulties tribes would face when
dealing with states.268 Thus, Congress ensured that tribes retained exclu-
sive control over their existing ceremonial gambling and sought to protect
tribes from state intervention over Class II gaming by giving the NIGC
concurrent jurisdiction.269 Furthermore, Congress sought to dispel the
fears of organized crime involvement in Class III gaming by establishing a
mechanism for state regulatory and economic participation in these activ-
ities via the Tribal-State compact.27°
C. Congressional Power to Abrogate
Congress' power to abrogate state sovereignty is more problematic.27'
The prevailing view is that Congress does not have abrogation powers
unless legislating pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
272
or the Interstate Commerce Clause.2 73 While the Fourteenth Amend-
267. Id. at 426. Commenting on S. 555, Senator Daniel Evans emphasized that "this bill
should be construed as an explicit preemption of the field of gaming in Indian country." S.
REP. No. 446, supra note 79, at 36, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3105.




271. See supra note 255 (discussing the problematic interpretation of the abrogation
exception).
272. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (subjecting states to suits for damages in
federal court). The Supreme Court held "that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle
of state sovereignty which it embodies are necessarily limited by the enforcement provi-
sions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 456 (citation omitted). The Court's
rationale acknowledged an express shift in the relationship between states and the federal
government because the Fourteenth Amendment limits state authority and at the same
time grants Congress the power to enforce that limit. Id. at 452-56; see also Jones, supra
note 12, at 149-51 (discussing federal cases relying on Fitzpatrick). Federal courts, how-
ever, also acknowledge Congress' power to abrogate state sovereign immunity when acting
under its plenary powers pursuant to other constitutional provisions such as: the Bank-
ruptcy Clause, In re McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 323 (7th Cir.) (citing U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 4), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 895 (1987); Article I war powers, Peel v. Florida
Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070, 1080 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11);
the extradition powers, County of Monroe v. Florida, 678 F.2d 1124, 1127 (2d Cir. 1982)
(citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104 (1983); the Copyright
Clause, Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
273. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1025 (11th Cir. 1994), petition for cert.
filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. July 1, 1994) (No. 94-12); see also Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma,
37 F.3d 1422, 1429 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed 63 U.S.L.W. 2176 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1994)
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ment protects liberty and property interests derived from " 'a legitimate
claim of entitlement,' ,274 it does not protect interests derived from "the
discretionary nature of the compacting process envisioned by IGRA."27 5
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit in Seminole Tribe concluded that because
IGRA creates no liberty or property interests, Congress did not abrogate
state sovereignty pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.276
The Eleventh Circuit was hesitant to rely on Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co. 277 for the proposition that Congress has blanket authority to abro-
gate state sovereign immunity under the Interstate Commerce Clause.278
Instead, the Eleventh Circuit restricted the Union Gas holding to specific
laws passed under the Interstate Commerce Clause.279 Courts following
the Eleventh Circuit's view contend that Union Gas' authority is weak280
because the make-up of the United States Supreme Court has changed
since the controversial plurality decision was handed down,28 1 and be-
cause it is likely that the majority of the current Court would disagree
with the decision.282
The Eleventh Circuit and its adherents also distinguish the Interstate
Commerce Clause from the Indian Commerce Clause.283 In Cotton Pe-
(No. 94-1029). Both courts recognize that in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,
19-20 (1989), a plurality of the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that the Inter-
state Commerce Clause provides an additional constitutional source of authority for con-
gressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Ponca, 37 F.3d at 1428.
274. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1025 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
577 (1972)).
275. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that IGRA does not create an entitlement to gam-
bling operations, but merely establishes standards by which Indian gaming may be con-
ducted. Id.
276. Id.
277. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (explaining Congress' power to abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity when enacting CERCLA and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986 (SARA)). The plurality opinion extended Congress' abrogation power to congres-
sional acts under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 19. The Court also adopted an implied
consent theory under which states, by ratifying the Constitution, consent to suit enforcing
regulations Congress enacted under its constitutional authority. Id. at 19-20.
278. Id. Union Gas is cited in opinions dealing with Eleventh Amendment state sover-
eign immunity claims under IGRA because courts rely on Union Gas to extend Congress'
abrogation authority to the Indian Commerce Clause as well as the Interstate Commerce
Clause. See Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1027.
279. Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1027 (noting specific statutes under the Commerce
Clause such as CERCLA and SARA).
280. See id. (noting that Union Gas was a plurality opinion authored by Justice Bren-
nan and joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, and concurred with by Justice
White).
281. Id. at 1027.
282. Id. Very little additional explanation has been provided to support this
contention.
283. See id. at 1026-27.
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troleum Corp. v. New Mexico,2 ' the United States Supreme Court held
that the Indian Commerce Clause grants Congress the "plenary power to
legislate in the field of Indian affairs. '285 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits
have conjunctively applied Union Gas and Cotton Petroleum to conclude
that Congress possesses plenary power under the Indian Commerce
Clause to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to IGRA. 286 The
Eleventh Circuit and its adherents, however, are reluctant to apply the
interstate commerce doctrine to intercourse with Indian Tribes.2 87 Fur-
thermore, these courts insist that Congress' power to abrogate state sov-
ereign immunity is restricted to legislation arising under the Interstate
Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.288
By applying Union Gas narrowly,2 89 or not at all,2 91 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit focused on the subject matter of Congress' power rather than the
type or extent of that power.291 Congress' plenary power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity is contained in Article I of the United States
Constitution. 92 This provision empowers Congress to regulate interstate
commerce and to shift the federal-state balance of power in favor of the
federal government when legislating in this area.2 93 This same provision
empowered Congress to regulate commerce with Indian tribes and for-
eign nations.294 By consenting to Congress' regulation of interstate com-
merce, states surrendered some sovereign immunity.295 Thus, they also
284. 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (holding that although the Interstate Commerce Clause and
the Indian Commerce Clause derive from the same constitutional grant of plenary power
to Congress in Article I, they have different applications and different legal
interpretations).
285. Id. at 192.
286. See Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1430-32 (10th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 2176 (U.S. Dec. 9, 1994) (No. 94-1029); Spokane Tribe of Indians v.
Washington, 28 F.3d 991, 995-97 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S.
Aug. 29, 1994) (No. 94-357).
287. See Seminole Tribe, 11 F.3d at 1025-28.
288. See id.
289. Id. at 1027 (explaining that the Union Gas holding should be limited to cases in-
volving the exercise of Congress' power to legislate under the Interstate Commerce
Clause).
290. Id. (explaining that Union Gas is not controlling in IGRA cases because of the
different purposes of the Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses). See supra
part III.C for a discussion of Congress' plenary power under these clauses.
291. Id.
292. U.S. CONST. art. t, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.")
293. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 661 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (citing Penn-
sylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)), rev'd, 11 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 1994).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 660.
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must surrender this same degree of sovereign immunity when affected by
congressional regulation over Indian gaming.
Congress' power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Com-
merce Clause should be interpreted broadly. As the Spokane court
noted, the Supreme Court in Union Gas did not intend to limit Congress'
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity to the interstate commerce
section of the Commerce Clause, but intended to include other clauses as
well.2 96 Congressional power to regulate commerce among the states
equals its power to regulate commerce relating to foreign nations and
Indian tribes.2 97 Thus, this equality of power should be understood to
imply that Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity when enact-
ing laws affecting both Indians and interstate commerce. 298 This is evi-
denced by the Court's general reference to the Commerce Clause.2 99 For
subsequent courts to comfortably apply the Union Gas test to the Indian
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court must expand its holding.3"
IV. CONCLUSION OF TRIBAL-STATE COMPACTS: AN IMPOSSIBILITY
WHEN STATES ASSERT THE SHIELD OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY
A. The Hurdle of Sovereign Immunity
Despite Congress' intent, states remain unwilling to relinquish control
over gambling within territorial borders.3 °1 States continue to refuse to
enter into compact negotiations with tribes, invoking the Eleventh
Amendment to bar federal jurisdiction.30 2 This effectively precludes
tribes from obtaining relief.30 3 Likewise, tribes are prevented from en-
gaging in lucrative, legal gaming activities for an indeterminate period of
time.3o4
To determine tribes' options when states refuse to negotiate compacts
in good faith, tribes must overcome the hurdle of state sovereign immu-
296. See Spokane Tribe of Indians v. Washington, 28 F.3d 991, 994-95 (9th Cir.), petition
for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3207 (U.S. Aug. 29, 1994) (No. 94-357).
297. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 15, at 130.
298. See Spokane, 28 F.3d at 996.
299. Id.
300. Id. (noting that despite the fact that it was a plurality decision of the Supreme
Court, Union Gas is still a binding decision).
301. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which states have
effectively blocked tribes from negotiating Class III gaming operations by invoking the
Eleventh Amendment).
302. See Ahola, supra note 16, at 933.
303. Id.
304. See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text (discussing the statutory time frame
for conclusion of Tribal-State compacts).
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nity. Unfortunately, this hurdle has been cleared in only four circuits: the
Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth.3"5 To fulfill the aims of IGRA, Indian
gaming must be permitted, states must be required to negotiate in good
faith with tribes, constitutional objections to IGRA must be overcome,
and the policy goals of promoting tribal self-sufficiency and economic in-
dependence must be actively pursued.
The state sovereign immunity hurdle may be overcome by legislative
fiat or judicial decree. Congress already has taken steps to reduce states'
sovereign immunity in the IGRA Amendments Act of 1994 (1994
Amendments). 3 6  Although Congress recently conducted hearings on
the 1994 Amendments, it did not take action on the Amendments by the
close of the 103d Congress.
307
305. See supra notes 271-300 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits' resolution of the Eleventh Amendment issue).
306. On June 23, 1994, the Senate introduced S. 2230, the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act Amendments Act of 1994. See 140 CONG. REC. S7561 (daily ed. June 23, 1994) (state-
ment of Sen. Inouye). The 1994 Amendments were a direct response to concerns voiced
by state governors and by tribes in certain regions of the country that felt thwarted in their
efforts to secure a Class Ill gaming compact. Id. The 1994 Amendments responded pri-
marily to the successful Tenth and Eleventh Amendment defenses used successfully by
states to defeat federal court jurisdiction. Id.
The 1994 Amendments proposed to establish clear federal standards for the conduct of
Class II and Class III gaming on Indian lands and to expand the federal presence in the
regulation of Class III gaming. Id. The federal presence would have been expanded via a
process permitting a state to choose whether it would enter into a Tribal-State compact for
the conduct of Class III gaming or whether it prefers to opt out entirely from the compact
process. Id. When a state chose the latter option, the Secretary of the Interior would
replace the state as the compacting party to the Indian tribe. Id. at S7561-62.
Other revisions included: a comprehensive licensing system to regulate the privilege of
doing business in Indian country, similar to systems in operation in Las Vegas and Atlantic
City; a procedure for assuring the consideration of all parties' interest when land is taken
into trust for gaming purposes; and a mechanism for federal regulation cost assessment.
Id. at S7652.
307. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act Amendments Act of 1994: Hearings on S. 2230
Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (July 25, 1994) (testimony
of the Honorable James E. Doyle, Attorney General of the State of Wisconsin and Chair,
National Association of Attorneys General Task Force). The 1994 Amendments were the
result of a negotiation process sponsored by Senators Inouye and McCain. Id. at 2. This
process sought to obtain concessions by states from using their Tenth and Eleventh
Amendment defenses in exchange for the establishment of a state law based definition of
the scope of gaming subject to negotiation. Id. Nevertheless, states' opposition to the 1994
Amendments was very strong. Id. States seek a more active role in the regulatory and
licensing process, the exclusion of slot machines from Class II games, and other limiting
provisions. Id. at 3-15.
Tribes also opposed the 1994 Amendments. See id. (statement of JoAnn Jones,
Chairperson, Wisconsin Winnebago Business Committee). Tribes fear that an expansion of
state law over reservation gaming activity is an encroachment on Indian sovereignty and
may threaten tribes opportunity for economic development. Id. at 1. Tribes are unsure
whether the inclusion of a provision that state participation in the compact process for
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The best way to overcome the hurdle of state sovereign immunity and
affirm Congress' power to legislate pursuant to the Indian Commerce
Clause is by a Supreme Court decision expressly recognizing Congress'
power to abrogate sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce
Clause. The Supreme Court should resolve the current circuit conflict
resulting from the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Seminole Tribe and the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Spokane by granting certiorari to the Seminole
and Poarch, tribes on this issue.
B. The Need for Clearing the Hurdle
In response to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Seminole Indian Tribe v.
Butterworth ,3 °8 Indians began to expand gaming operations rapidly.
309
States then began to challenge Indian gaming activities and litigation en-
sued.31° When courts applied the civil/regulatory criminal/prohibitory di-
chotomy of Public Law 280 established in Butterworth311 and affirmed by
the Supreme Court in Cabazon, Indian gaming operators were favored
heavily.312 To the chagrin of the states, the Cabazon Court balanced the
competing interests of tribes and states and decided that encouraging tri-
bal self-sufficiency and economic development was of paramount impor-
tance.313 The Supreme Court recognized that, in most cases, these tribal
gaming operations were the primary source of revenue for tribal govern-
ments and the primary source of employment for tribal members.314
At the time Cabazon was being decided, Congress was drafting S.
555.315 Because the Supreme Court's decision in Cabazon favored tribes,
state support for IGRA increased.31 6 States, consistent with their desire
Class III gaming "is 'deemed to constitute a voluntary waiver of the sovereign immunity of
the State for the purposes of this Act.'" Id. at 7 (quoting S. 2230, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 10(a)(3)(B)(iv) (1994)). They are concerned that the "deemed to constitute a voluntary
waiver" language of the Act does not satisfy the test of an express waiver. Id. Finally, they
note that the constitutional question of whether. Congress has the power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity at all will not be resolved until the Supreme Court decides the ques-
tion. Id.
308. 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020 (1982).
309. See Wilson, supra note 60, at 380 (acknowledging that Indians have been con-
ducting bingo operations regularly since 1974).
310. Id. at 381.
311. Butterworth, 658 F.2d at 311; see supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing
the civil/regulatory criminal/prohibitory dichotomy in Cabazon).
312. See Swanson, supra note 132, at 473 (noting that the civil/regulatory criminal/pro-
hibitory dichotomy favored Indian gambling activities and posed serious problems for state
imposition of limits on types of gaming).
313. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 219.
314. Id. at 218-19.
315. S. REP. No. 446, supra note 79, at 2, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N at 3071-72.
316. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3083.
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to control all activities within their borders, became envious of the tax-
free revenues generated by tribes through gaming operations and were
concerned with the loss of revenue from their own gaming operations.317
They viewed the burgeoning Indian gambling market as competition for
state lotteries, race tracks, and other gaming operations.318
Although IGRA responded to state concerns, it also sought to provide
a framework to protect tribal sovereignty. 319 The basis for this frame-
work is the Tribal-State compact and the requirement that states negoti-
ate in good faith.32 ° The only means available to tribes to enforce section
2710's requirement of negotiating a Tribal-State compact to a conclusion
is access to the federal district courts.321 Tribes, however, are denied this
mechanism because states invoke the Eleventh Amendment to preclude
federal jurisdiction.322 Thus, unless tribes can sue states in federal district
court for failure to negotiate in good faith, it is impossible for the courts
to fashion an appropriate good faith standard.323
It is ironic that the states, the primary force behind enactment of
IGRA, now have decided that they are not subject to its provisions.
Many states are in the process of enacting legislation permitting gambling
and are buying time to ensure that tribal casinos will never become com-
petitors.324 By refusing to negotiate with tribes and refusing to submit to
federal jurisdiction, states extend the length of time tribes are denied a
major source of income. Furthermore, new judicial and legislative devel-
opments threaten the closing of this potential source of tribal revenue.325
Thus, the Supreme Court should eliminate state use of the Eleventh
Amendment to contravene the purposes and policies behind IGRA by
recognizing Congress' power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under
the Indian Commerce Clause.
317. See Swanson, supra note 132, at 473.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988); see supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text (discussing
IGRA's provisions mandating tribal-state negotiations for compact conclusion).
321. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710.
322. See supra notes 14-19, 245-50 and accompanying text (discussing recent cases in
which states have successfully used the Eleventh Amendment to bar suits brought by
tribes).
323. See supra notes 208-42 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' inability to
interpret the good faith requirement when IGRA cases are dismissed on Eleventh Amend-
ment grounds).
324. Hellman, supra note 7, at 83 (identifying Hawaii and Utah as the only states im-
posing a total ban on a commercial gambling).
325. See supra notes 16, 199-202 and accompanying text (discussing concerns and
trends that pose hazards for Indian gaming).
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C. Policy Considerations
Many states, including Connecticut, Wisconsin, Michigan, and more re-
cently, New York, acknowledged the Department of the Interior's en-
dorsement of Tribal-State compacts for Class III gaming and successfully
negotiated agreements.326 A number of states are skilled in concluding
compacts on very favorable terms.327 While some, like Minnesota, are
cognizant of the economic benefits that flow from gaming operations,328
others oppose gambling altogether.329 Even in states where Tribal-State
compacts regarding Class III gaming have been concluded, however,
tribes may be denied the opportunity to modify compact provisions.330
Given the questionable legitimacy of forces gathering against Indian gam-
ing and, conversely, the current lack of evidence that Indian gaming has
spawned an upsurge in crime, 331 public policy dictates that Indian gaming
326. See Santoni, supra note 79, at 438-44 (listing 55 compacts concluded as of August
10, 1992).
327. See Robert D. McFadden, Cuomo Accepts Mohawk Plan for a Casino, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1993, at A25. Governor Cuomo signed a compact with the Mohawk tribe
to permit the building of a $10 million Las Vegas style casino near the Canadian border. Id.
The compact provided for stiff state regulation, permitted dice, roulette, and card games,
but banned alcohol and the operation of slot machines. Id.
328. See Santoni, supra note 79, at 438-44. Minnesota concluded 22 Tribal-State com-
pacts between April 1990 and October 1991. Id.
329. See Susan Stanich, Indians Say States Stack Deck Against Reservation Gambling
Operations, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1992, at A16 (identifying Wisconsin, Florida, Mississippi,
Washington, and Michigan as uncooperative in negotiating with tribes to establish gam-
bling operations); see also Mary Jo Pitzl, Governor Vows to Sign Indian Gaming Pacts Even
if Lawmakers Don't Kill Ban, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, June 10, 1993, at B1. Governor Fife
Symington requested the state legislature to repeal its recent ban on casino gambling and
to adopt a negotiating approach that bases the size of the casino on the size and economic
needs of the tribe. Id.
Governor Symington, however, is not a proponent of Indian gambling as indicated by his
statements that federal and tribal authorization of Indian gambling encroaches on state
sovereignty. Paul Bender, Legal Ins, Outs on Indian Gambling; Confusion and Misinfor-
mation Surround Issue, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Mar. 21, 1993, at Cl. Furthermore, Governor
Symington criticized the federally appointed mediator for authorizing extensive casino
gambling when he selected the tribes' proposal after compact negotiations broke down
over Arizona's policy to permit only 250 gambling devices per tribe, regardless of tribe size
or economic needs. Id.
330. See Wisconsin Winnebago Nation v. Thompson, 824 F. Supp. 167, 170 (W.D. Wis.
1993), aff'd, 22 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 1994). The district court held that upon conclusion of a
Tribal-State compact, Class III gaming activity is " 'subject to the terms and conditions of
the Tribal-State compact . . . that is in effect.' " Id. at 172-73 (quoting 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d)(2)(C) (1988)). The district court acknowledged the existence of circumstances in
which a tribe may sue a state to compel good faith negotiations over Class III gaming even
when a compact has been concluded. Id. at 173.
331. See Mitchell Zuckoff, Fears, Footprints of Organized Crime, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
29, 1993, at 25 (discussing congressional testimony by the FBI and United States Depart-
ment of Justice officials regarding the lack of documented evidence of organized crime
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be permitted.332 Because of tribes' successes in improving their economic
conditions via gaming operations, tribes view gambling as today's meta-
phorical equivalent to the buffalo, that hallowed beast 33 3 associated with
spiritual and economic well-being.
334
V. CONCLUSION
Indian high-stakes gaming is a major means for tribes to achieve eco-
nomic and social development. In states where it is permitted, tribal casi-
nos are a boon to both reservations and local economies. Gaming also is
responsible for changes in the outlook of the Indians themselves.
IGRA seeks to protect and preserve the Indian tribes' sovereign status
while providing a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework to facil-
itate the exploitation of the economic opportunities afforded by gam-
bling. Unfortunately, while this intent was clearly documented in the
legislative history, the statute itself contains gaps that have enabled states
to undermine the purpose of the law completely.
To achieve IGRA's established goals, the Supreme Court must act to
prevent states from use of judicial delaying tactics to circumvent the au-
thority of IGRA, a law the states framed. At the same time, swift and
thorough legislative action also is required to prevent states from denying
tribes their only remedy available at law.
Marianne T. Caulfield
links to Indian gaming). A high-ranking FBI organized crime investigator admitted, how-
ever, that although there has not been any systematic attempt by the mafia to infiltrate
Indian gaming, it may be a legitimate concern in certain locales. Id. Thus, tribes are taking
measures to protect themselves. Id.
332. See supra notes 328-29 and accompanying text; see also Tribes Losing Millions in
Casino Revenue, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1993, at A4 (noting that the Department of Justice
has found no evidence that organized crime has infiltrated Indian gaming).
333. California Indians Buffalo Stakes, ECONOMIST, July 25, 1993, at 25, 25 (comment-
ing that gambling is nearly as beneficial to the welfare of the tribes as the buffalo was to
Indians).
334. Ellen O'Brien, A 'Miracle' beast, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 2, 1994, at G1 (discussing
the spiritual significance of the August 20, 1994 birth of Miracle, the rare white buffalo, in
Wisconsin). For centuries, the buffalo has been a source of life to tribes that inhabited the
North American Great Plains. Id. at G4. The buffalo was the tribes' source of meat for
food, hide for clothes and tepees, and manure chips for fuel. Id. It also was "an earthly
connection to religious experience and grace" for the tribes. Id. It remains, however, to be
seen if Indian gaming meets the same fate as the buffalo, nearly a century ago-extinction.
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